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Abstract 
 
Organized crime organizations arise to satisfy a demand for necessary social services in 
the absence of effective government institutions.  This project examines the rise of the 
Sicilian mafia.  Using system dynamics, I model this system and test various policies to 
determine what factors have the greatest impact on mafia power.  Based on these 
experiments, the most effective policies for reducing mafia power are those that decrease 
the demand for private protection services by reducing the threat of banditry in society, 
and not those policies that act against the mafia directly.  I also examine historical 
examples of other mafia-type organizations to show that these trends apply not just to 
Sicily, but also to other societies, including present-day Iraq and Afghanistan.   
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Executive Summary 
 Organized crime is a problem faced by many types of societies in today’s global 
economy.  It is prevalent in both the poorest developing countries and the most developed 
nations (Milhaupt & West 2000).  Acquiring an understanding of the dynamics that led to 
the formation of these organized criminal organizations is an important step in evaluating 
the effectiveness of policies that are intended to reduce their power.  Recent studies of 
organized crime have focused on the observations that criminal syndicates often arise 
during times of political transition (Bandiera 2003, Milhaupt & West 2000).  The states 
of lawlessness associated with these transitions can make personal property crimes more 
profitable for bandits or other criminals.  However, organized crime groups tend to derive 
much of their power not by exploiting the opportunity for property crime, but by offering 
services such as property and personal protection that are normally provided by 
government institutions.  In this way, these “mafias” initially gain much of their power by 
acting as a parallel or substitute legal system.    
 In this paper we examine the origins of one of the most famous organized crime 
syndicates:  the Sicilian mafia.  The mafia had its origins in  the mid-1800s after Sicily 
abolished feudalism and joined the newly formed Italian state.  As a consequence of the 
social upheaval associated with these political and economic changes and the resulting 
lack of an effective government police force, banditry reached extreme levels in much of 
rural Sicily during the 19th-century.  Accordingly, a demand emerged for private property 
protection amongst peasants who lived in rural areas and earned most their income by 
sharecropping lands owned by absentee landowners.  At the same time, these former 
feudal landowners sought a new mechanism to enforce the social status quo by 
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preventing peasants from demanding comprehensive land redistribution.  The mafia came 
into existence to provide these services, and as a result, quickly became an important part 
of Sicilian society. 
 Using systems dynamics computer software, we developed a model of the societal 
dynamics in 19th-century Sicily to help gain insights into the factors that impact the 
power of the mafia and the effectiveness of policies that are intended to reduce its power.  
At its core lies a relationship between three population classes: the peasants, the bandits, 
and the mafia, with flows between each class.  The peasants earn their income from 
farming, the bandits derive most of their income by robbing the peasants, and the mafia 
earns income by collecting tribute from both the peasants and the bandits.  As banditry 
increases, peasants are willing to pay more for protection services, and as a result, the 
mafia is able to charge higher rates of tribute, thereby increasing its political and 
economic power. 
 We used our model to perform several numeric simulation experiments that test 
the effectiveness of various anti-mafia policies.  In general, we found that the most 
important factor in determining the relative power of the mafia is the absence of effective 
government institutions.  That is, the mafia is most powerful in societies where the 
government is not able to adequately control banditry.  Furthermore, if the mafia is 
eliminated but the underlying problems facing society remain the same, then a 
replacement mafia will inevitably form, even if paying tribute to the mafia causes the 
peasants to be economically worse off than they would be under uncontrolled banditry.    
 Policies that increase the population in areas controlled by the mafia tend to 
reduce the relative power of the mafia in the short-term, but lead to a more powerful 
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mafia in the long-term.  In contrast, policies that cause the population of the areas 
controlled by the mafia to decrease are a means of effectively reducing mafia power in 
the long-term, although they result in a more powerful mafia in the short-term and, as a 
result, may be politically undesirable.  We also note that policies that increase the 
productivity of peasants in lands controlled by the mafia have only minimal impacts on 
relative mafia power, and are not likely to be cost-effective.  Finally, we use our model to 
demonstrate that, although the mafia can increase its relative power by increasing its 
tribute demands, doing so may not be economically optimal for the mafia’s leaders.  This 
observation provides further support for the theories that organized crime syndicates do 
not rely primarily on extortion for the basis of their power, but rather on the legitimacy 
that they gain from providing services desired by members of society.   
 In addition to the Sicilian mafia, we also examine the origins of several other 
mafia-like organizations, including the Japanese yakuza, Hong Kong triads, Russian mob, 
Shiite gangs in 19th-century Ottoman Iraq, and Ugandan drinking companies and 
vigilante groups.  Each of these organizations shares similar traits with the Sicilian mafia.  
For example, they emerged during times of political and social change that were 
generally characterized by high levels of crime and a lack of necessary social institutions. 
Each organization also derived much of its power by acting as a substitute legal system 
that offered services normally provided by government institutions, such as property 
protection.  As such, the lessons of our model apply to any lawless society characterized 
by conditions favorable for the formation of mafias, including present-day Iraq and 
Afghanistan.   These lessons have important ramifications not only with regard to law-
enforcement, but also on foreign policy and anti-terrorism efforts. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Organized crime is a pervasive problem in much of today’s global economy 
(Milhaupt & West 2000).  Syndicates and cartels control much of the world’s global 
narcotics trade, and also earn significant profits from illegal activities such as gambling, 
prostitution, smuggling, extortion, and racketeering.  Of these global crime syndicates, 
perhaps the most famous is the Sicilian mafia.  Although the modern perception of the 
mafia is based heavily on media portrayals such as the Godfather movies or The 
Sopranos television show, it is important to realize that the mafia’s roots were not as a 
normal bandit gang that used the threat of violence and extortion to gain power through 
entirely illegitimate means.  Rather, most organized crime syndicates, including the 
mafia, initially gained much of their power by acting as parallel or substitute legal 
system, taking advantage of high demands for services such as private protection during 
periods or places characterized by an absence of effective government institutions.   
In this report, we examine the Sicilian mafia in an effort to better understand the 
dynamics associated with the formation of mafias.  The Sicilian mafia came into 
existence during a time of transition in Sicily following the abolition of feudalism and the 
creation of the Italian state.   Prior to the Italian revolutions of 1848 and 1860, land 
ownership in Sicily was based on a feudal system with peasants living on land owned by 
absentee landlords.  To ensure that they maintained control of their property, these 
landlords would often rent their property to middle-class intermediaries, known as 
“gabelloti” who managed the estates and often coerced local peasants into working on the 
lands for low wages.  The period following the abolition of feudalism saw not only an 
increase in the number of landowners with property to protect, but also in banditry and 
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the associated threats to personal property.  As a result of this breakdown in social 
structures and the inability of the absentee landowners to maintain the status quo by 
controlling the peasants, the influence of the gabelloti increased and they became the de 
facto agents of law and order in rural Sicily.  In this manner, a system of patronage 
developed where the gabelloti received payments from the landowners in return for 
suppression of the peasantry and payments from the peasantry in return for the promise of 
protection and continued employment.  These gabelloti and the soldiers they hired to 
enforce the system of patronage and control banditry were the genesis of today’s modern 
Sicilian mafia (Blok 1966, Blok 1969, Bandiera 2003).   
Chapter 2 below provides background discussion of the conditions in Sicily that 
led to the formation of the Sicilian mafia.  Based on the understanding of the system 
obtained during our literature review, we developed a system dynamics computer model 
that describe the dynamics behind the landownership system in 19th-century Sicily and 
the conditions that led to the formation of the mafia.  This model is heavily inspired by a 
generic system that Saeed and Pavlov (2008) developed for representing a system 
characterized by the presence of related social and asocial controls.  Chapter 3 first 
provides an overview of the dynamics and relationships behind our model and then 
presents the mathematical equations that we use to represent these relationships.   
In Chapter 4, we use our model to simulate the effects that changing various 
parameters has on the overall composition of the system in terms of the relative 
populations of peasants, bandits, and mafia, as well as on various social indices including 
lawlessness (i.e., the relative amount of banditry and mafia activities in society), 
economic integrity (i.e., the amount of production retained by the peasants), and the 
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relative political and economic power of the mafia.  These experiments include modeling 
the results of policies that: increase the effectiveness of government institutions; 
temporarily eliminate the mafia; permanently eliminate the mafia; increase or decrease 
peasant population; and increase overall agricultural productivity.  We also show that 
there are strong incentives for the mafia to maintain a perceived sense of legitimacy 
amongst the peasants rather than try to maximize its income by solely relying on the 
threat of violence to extort income from local peasants.   
In Chapter 5, we take the lessons learned from our numeric simulation 
experiments specific to the Sicilian mafia and examine the conditions that led to the 
formation of five other historical mafia-type organizations.  We discuss the similarities 
between these disparate mafias, demonstrating that the policy recommendations 
associated with our model apply not only to conditions in 19th-century Sicily, but also to 
almost any condition of lawlessness and lack of effective government institutions that are 
favorable to the formation of a mafia-type organization.  These lessons are particularly 
relevant today when anticipating the likely results of rapid societal change in such global 
hotspots as Iraq and Afghanistan, as current conditions in both countries suggest the 
emergence of a market for services that have historically been provided by mafia-like 
organizations.   
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Chapter 2 - Mafia in Sicily: a Historical Perspective 
 
Before creating a model, it is important to gain a sufficient understanding of the 
structure and dynamics of the system you are examining.  In this chapter, I provide an 
overview of the conditions that led to the rise of the mafia in Sicily during the 19th 
century.  I begin with a discussion of the structure of land ownership on the island prior 
to the abolishment of feudalism.  I then discuss the attempts at land reform made during 
the 19th century, the resulting impacts on the landownership structure, and the emergence 
of the mafia that resulted from the introduction of a new type of middle-class landowner.  
The third section provides an overview of the role of bandits and mafia in Sicily, 
followed by a section that discusses the social conditions that have led to the continuing 
influence of the mafia in Sicilian society during the 20th century, despite its overall 
detriment to the well-being of society as a whole.  Finally, I conclude this chapter by 
providing a brief description of an existing economic model of the origins of the Sicilian 
mafia.   
2.1 Sicily under Feudalism 
 Prior to the 19th-century, the structure of society in Sicily was based on feudalism, 
or serfdom, similar to that of most of medieval Europe.  A feudal society is one that is 
characterized by a dominant stratification between two classes:  a small elite minority 
that own almost all of the land in rural areas while living in urban areas; and a large 
peasant population that lives in small villages and works the land for minimal 
compensation while passively accepting its subservient role (Blok 1966).   
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In Sicily, the feudal structure consisted of land that was divided into large estates, 
or feudo, owned by barons or other nobility (Blok 1966).  These barons were granted 
their power by the foreign powers that historically ruled the island (e.g., the Spanish, the 
Austrian Hapsburgs, and the Bourbon kings of Naples), who relied on a few local noble 
families to manage public affairs.  In return, these families were given control over lands 
encompassing three-quarters of the villages on the island (Bandiera 2003).  Because the 
land-owning aristocrats tended to live in either Naples or Palermo, many of them leased 
their property to tenants known as gabelloti who managed the lands in their stead.  The 
gabelloti agreed to pay a fixed annual sum to the owner, and acted as “substitute 
landlords who run the estates, live on them and conclude labour contracts with the 
peasants” (Blok 1966).  Each baron also maintained a standing army that they used to 
protect their fields and police the peasants (Bandiera 2003). 
Under the feudal system, peasants were obligated to work on the land owned by 
the ruling class in return for a small percentage of the food that they produced and the 
promise of protection from bandits and the armies of neighboring lords and barons.  The 
landowners also granted certain minimal land rights to the peasants, including the rights 
to use the land for hunting, pasturing of livestock, and gleaning grain that was leftover 
from the harvest (Blok 1966).  These agreements were arranged through the use of 
written charters, although encroachments on the rights of peasants “were the rule in this 
period, during which the lords, and gradually in their wake the great lease-holders 
(gabelloti), usurped the domanial and communal lands on which the peasants had various 
rights … fundamental for their livelihood” (Blok 1969).   
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2.2 Landownership Reforms in 19th-Century Sicily 
The British gained control of Sicily during the Napoleonic Wars of the early 19th-
century and officially abolished feudalism by law on the island in 1812 (Bandiera 2003).  
The Bourbon kings continued these reforms after regaining control of Sicily in 1816.  
These land reforms included: 
• The abolition of primogeniture (i.e., the tradition of the first-born son inheriting 
all of his fathers’ property to the exclusion of younger siblings) in 1820; 
• The seizure of land in settlement of debts in 1824; and, 
• An order giving peasants property rights over at least one-fifth of the land where 
common rights were enjoyed under feudalism (Bandiera 2003). 
As a result, the number of large landowners in Sicily increased from 2,000 to 20,000 
between 1812 and 1860 (Bandiera 2003). However, Blok notes that this attempt at 
landownership reform did not have any significant de facto consequences and, if 
anything, actually reinforced existing structures by weakening the position of the peasant 
class (Blok 1966, 1969).  Specifically, although members of the peasant class were freed 
from their positions of servitude, the vast majority were still excluded from any forms of 
landownership while also losing their traditional rights under feudalism.   
 Instead of empowering the peasants, the land reforms initiated in Sicily during the 
19th-century led to the creation of a new class of landowners comprised of the gabelloti.  
Although many of the large feudal estates were broken into small parcels following the 
abolition of feudalism, ownership of most of these properties was granted to their former 
stewards (i.e., gabelloti), rather than to peasants (Blok 1966).  Often this occurred 
because the estate-owners anticipated the expropriation of their lands by the government 
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and were eager to sell them before they lost their ownership to anyone who would be 
willing to pay (Blok 1969).  The gabelloti, in turn, used their new riches and power to 
acquire a position amongst the elite upper classes. Although reluctant to give up power, 
the old aristocracy found that they had a common interest with the gabelloti in terms of 
suppressing the peasantry at any price.  Thus, as long as the gabelloti were able to 
continue the maintenance of a social structure built around quasi-feudalism, the 
aristocracy was willing to allow them into the system of landownership (Blok 1966).   
 The Italian Revolution of 1860 and the formation of the new Italian state 
(including Sicily and the former Papal States) had additional ramifications on the societal 
structure of Sicily.  For example, from 1862-1863, the state confiscated a large share of 
public and church landholdings and redistributed them to the public (Bandiera 2003).  
This land distribution resulted in the creation of more than 20,000 private landowners 
(Blok 1969).  However, most peasants were again excluded from this redistribution, as 
the vast majority of these properties were given to their former landlords, the gabelloti 
(Blok 1966, 1969).  Moreover, those lands that were given to peasants tended to be very 
small (e.g. 4.5 hectares) and of the very lowest quality.  As a result, their owners often 
had to earn their livelihood by continuing to work as share-croppers on their former 
masters lands (Blok 1966).  Other peasants found that the land reform meant that they 
had lost access to the land for traditional uses granted to them by the church.1 (Blok 
1966)  
                                                 
1 Blok cites the example of a village in Sicily with 700 ha of wooded land confiscated from a local 
monastery in the 1860s.  When this estate was under control of the church, peasants were allowed to use the 
land for such purposes as gathering firewood and pasturing livestock, and the monastery provided an 
important source of employment and alms.   When the estate was confiscated, a local Mafioso used his 
influence to arrange an auction where a merchant from a lower social stratum gained ownership of the 
property for a very low price.  This provided the Mafiosi with a loyal servant while keeping control of the 
land away from the peasantry.  (Blok 1966) 
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The post-revolution land reform had additional unintended consequences that 
helped encourage the growth of the mafia. Notably, the confiscation of church lands led 
to a feeling of hostility amongst the Popes towards the Italian government, and because 
Sicily was a stronghold of Catholicism, its citizens were strongly influenced by the 
Popes’ edicts that Catholics refuse to cooperate with the new state.  As a result, the Italian 
government had very little social control over much of Sicily.  For example, there were 
usually less than 350 policemen stationed in the entire island of Sicily (or one per 28 
square miles) (Bandiera 2003).2  Moreover, bandits exacerbated the sense of lawlessness 
by arguing that any peasant who sought the help of the police was going against the direct 
wishes of the Pope.  In some communities, it was even considered a civic duty to keep 
the police out of local affairs (Brögger 1968).  This power vacuum would be instrumental 
in the rise of the mafia.   
2.3 The Role of Mafia and Bandits in Sicilian Society 
As discussed in the previous section, the societal structure of mid-19th century 
Sicily was characterized by two major factors: a general sense of lawlessness due to the 
absence of an effective state police force, and a de facto feudal system where most of the 
land in rural areas was owned by a relatively small number of absentee landlords.  These 
factors resulted in a peasantry that found itself beset by crime and looking for an 
organization that could provide a sense of order.  The mafia stepped in to fill this role.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
2  The government also instituted twenty-five “Companies at Arms” or “cavalry,” comprised mainly of 
former bandits and criminals, to police the countryside.  These companies would arrive in each town two or 
three times a year to round up a token number of criminals, followed by periods of months where all crime 
went unpunished by the state.  In addition, these companies were notoriously susceptible to corruption and 
often colluded with the same bandits that they were intended to persecute. (Bandiera 2006) 
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Following the Italian revolution, bandits infested large areas of rural Sicily.  Part 
of the increase in crime was directly caused by the confiscation of church estates and the 
sale of the land to private hands, as peasants who found that they no longer had access to 
traditional sources of income (i.e., firewood gathering, livestock grazing) turned to a life 
of banditry instead (Blok 1969).  The extent of the lawlessness can be seen in a local 
report from rural Sicily in 1914: “Thefts of cattle and the killing of men and animals are 
such common occurrences that the papers do not even report them any more” (Blok 
1966).  A Sicilian magistrate noted in 1874 that “people in the countryside [are] more 
afraid of criminals than they are of the Law … [the] public force is completely overcome 
by the strength of the criminals” (Bandiera 2003).  Farmlands and vineyards were 
particularly vulnerable to theft as local peasants chose to reside in small towns or villages 
rather than the countryside, both for reasons of safety (Blok 1966) and because farming 
techniques did not require permanent workers (Bandiera 2003).   
Under feudalism, absentee landowners in Sicily used standing armies to protect 
their property from bandits and to control the peasantry.  After the abolition of feudalism, 
the legal power of enforcement lay in control of the state police force.  However, due to 
the ineffectiveness of the local police in controlling banditry, landowners were forced to 
obtain private protection.   This was accomplished primarily through leasing the property 
to a gabelloto, who in turn hired a suite of retainers to act as a private police force (Blok 
1969).  These police forces consisted of two positions: a soprastante, or administrator of 
the estate; and the campieri, armed men on horseback who protected the estate from such 
transgressions as theft or abusive pasturage.  Both positions were paid annually, and were 
peasants who were often recruited from the ranks of bandits or common criminals, as the 
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main criterion for their employment was the quality to make themselves respected by the 
local population (Blok 1969).  Landowners “preferred to hire the best and most violent 
bandits as guardians of their properties, thus using the criminal reputation of one as a 
defense against the crimes of others …” (Bandiera 2003).    
The mafia also played an important part in running the local economy, as many 
gabelloti acted as landlords for the absentee land owners.  They would lease small plots 
of about five hectares to peasants for one year and provide seed for sowing.  In return the 
peasants would be allowed to farm their plots, using their own equipment.  At harvest 
time, the gabelloto would take the first sowing-seed from the crop and divided the 
remainder into three parts:  two for the gabelloto and one for the sharecropper.  The 
farmer would also be required to give 14 kg of his share to the campiere, although he 
would often give more than required in the hope of being considered for another contract 
in the following year (Blok 1966).  This tribute was given in return for a promise by the 
campiere to guarantee the protection of the peasant’s life and property.  One report noted 
that, “Every peasant who wishes to avoid trouble has to pay a tribute to the mala gente 
(lit. ‘bad people’)” (Blok 1966).  In the end, most sharecroppers were left with only one-
quarter to one-fifth of their crops, and in years of drought or poor productivity, often 
were left in debt to the gabelloto.  Such debtors were often forced to steal to make ends 
meet, thus exacerbating the problem of lawlessness (Blok 1966).  
In this way, the gabelloti, soprastante, and campieri (i.e., the mafia) gained an 
enormous position of power in rural Sicily.  They used the threat of uncontrolled banditry 
(often committed by the campieri themselves) to force their protection services on the 
absentee landlords and peasants.  At the same time a combination of the promise of 
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rewards (e.g. favorable lands for farming) as well as a threat of violence and intimidation 
allowed the mafia to exploit the lower class.  A positive feedback loop also existed which 
reinforced the growing strength of the mafia: as more people went to the mafia for ask for 
protection, the stronger it became with respect to legitimate enforcement, causing its 
political power to increase even further (Bandiera 2003).  Moreover, the mafia 
recognized the source of their power and would occasionally allow bandits to operate 
with impunity in exchange for a share of the profits. For example, Blok (1966) noted that 
cattle-rustling was a common problem faced by peasants in mid-20th-century rural Sicily, 
although it would have been impossible for local bandits to steal cattle without the 
assistance of the local mafia who possessed the necessary knowledge of the village.  
However, once the mafia had become entrenched within the political landscape, it no 
longer needed to rely as much on the threat of banditry to give it legitimacy as it could 
retain its power by buying blocks of votes during elections instead.  Indeed, the rate of 
banditry did in fact decline after it lost the protection of the mafia in the 20th-century 
(Blok 1969).    
2.4 Mafia Entrenchment in Sicily 
The mafia, as comprised of the gabelloti and campieri, derived much of their 
economic power in Sicily by virtue of the quasi-feudalistic land-ownership structure.  
Notably, they relied on tribute paid by peasant sharecroppers as their main source of 
income.  As discussed in a previous section, any attempts at land reform would act to the 
detriment of the mafia as well as the land-owners, as it would eliminate their monopoly 
on arable land.  If each peasant was given ownership of his own plot of land, then the 
gabelloto would no longer be able to charge extortionate tribute fees from the peasants in 
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return for the opportunity to work the lands he controls.  As such, maintaining the status 
quo with regard the land-ownership structure was extremely important to the mafia, and 
we would expect them to use any means necessary to protect it.   
In their book Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2006), 
Acemoglu and Robinson discuss the factors that influence the political structures of 
different societies.  They characterize societies as being comprised of two classes: a 
relatively small number of elites that hold much of the economic power, and a large, 
relatively poor peasant class.  In general, the elites wish to maximize their political and 
economic power at the expense of the peasants.  However, by virtue of their numbers, the 
peasants wield de facto political power in that they can incite a revolution to overthrow 
the elite class.  The elites wish to avoid revolution at any cost, as a successful revolution 
would entail the loss of all of their economic and political power.  Meanwhile, although a 
revolution may benefit the peasant class, it also entails many types of potential costs, 
including loss of earnings and lives, destruction of infrastructure, and the risks of reprisal 
by the elites following a failed revolution.  Given this, peasants will only revolt if it is in 
their best economic interest, i.e., the expected benefits of revolution outweigh the 
expected costs.   
According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), elites have two major options to 
decrease the risks of revolution in society: offering concessions to the peasant class, and 
using the threat of violence to actively suppress the peasantry.  Typical concessions 
include the shift towards democracy, redistribution of wealth through social projects, and 
the institution of policies that are favorable to the majority.  These actions are associated 
with net costs to the elites.  However, they make the societal status quo more favorable to 
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the peasant class, thereby reducing the potential benefits and likelihood of revolution.  
Violent repression, such as that used in apartheid South Africa or by China during the 
Tiananmen Square uprising of 1989, is attractive to elites “because it allows them to 
maintain power without making any concessions to the disenfranchised” (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006).  However, the use of force is still costly and risky to the elites as 
violence leads to the destruction of property, loss of life, reduced economic production, 
and greater desire for future revolution amongst the peasant class. 
Several factors can increase the likelihood of revolution in society. One of the 
most important of these factors is the relative distribution of wealth in society.  Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2006) define “inequality” as the fraction of the total production in society 
that accrues to the elite class.  As inequality increases, the potential benefits of revolution 
for the peasants increase, thereby leading to an increased probability of the peasants 
revolting.  Thus, in a society such as 19th-century Sicily where the elites have an 
economic incentive to increase the amount of total production that accrues to them, they 
must also be careful to not increase that share so much that the peasant class decides to 
revolt.  Alternatively, by offering concessions that increase their legitimacy and support 
among the peasant class (e.g., by offering needed services or rewarding political 
supporters), the elites can increase both the costs of revolution and the threshold of 
inequality that will result in a revolution.   
The history of Sicily shows that the elites were generally successful in 
suppressing the desire for revolution among the peasant class.  Sicily does have a history 
of spontaneous uprisings by peasants to protest against abuses in the system.  However, 
these protests, which were often instigated by crop failures or other times of extreme 
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poverty, were not intended to change the system itself, and, as a result, never developed 
into a revolutionary movement (Blok 1969).  Given the high amount of inequality 
between the elites and peasants in Sicily, we would expect a strong desire for revolution 
in the system, based on the theories of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).  The fact that 
there was never a strong revolutionary movement against the status quo strongly suggests 
that the elites were able to create a system where the expected benefits of revolution for 
the peasants did not exceed the expected costs.   
As discussed in previous sections, the mafia in Sicily was a necessary institution 
for maintaining social order.  Essentially, it acted as a “parallel or substitute legal system” 
that assumed the duties of the weak and ineffective state government (Blok 1966).   In 
addition to protecting peasants from bandits, the mafia also offered a means of mediating 
disputes (Blok 1969).  Due to the respect and massive power that a Mafiosi would hold in 
a village, he was able to offer his services as an arbitrator when resolving local conflicts 
between peasants, disputes that otherwise would often lead to deadly feuds amongst 
villagers (Brögger 1968).   Thus, although the peasants had the choice to revolt against 
the status quo and overthrow the mafia’s control of the land-ownership system, the 
resulting chaos and lack of police enforcement likely would have led to an anarchistic 
society with rampant banditry and crime.   That is, the potential costs of revolution were 
extremely high, leading to a system where the mafia could demand enormous amounts of 
tribute from the peasants without the risk of endangering the status quo.     
By offering services to the local community, the tribute demanded by mafia 
became seen less as a system of blackmail and more as an unofficial “tax”, or even a 
transaction used to purchase a Mafiosi’s loyalty (Brögger 1968).  A peasant who paid 
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tribute could expect to be rewarded with more favorable judgments in disputes where the 
Mafiosi acted as arbitrator (Brögger 1968).  Furthermore, by controlling the land, the 
mafia could reward loyal peasants by giving them the best lands for sharecropping or by 
hiring them for employment.  Blok (1969) notes that the general picture was “of a crowd 
of peasants who queued up at the entrance of the club of the [elite] in the village to apply 
humbly for a labour-contract.”  Those peasants who did not participate in the patronage 
system were often at a severe disadvantage to those who did.  When the Communist Party 
tried to change the system of landownership in Sicily to one of peasant-owned co-
operatives, its members and sympathizers were “denied access to the economic resources 
which the Mafiosi commanded” (Blok 1969).  As a result, peasants had a strong incentive 
not to join the Communist Party, and the land reforms that it advocated never happened.   
The mafia also reduced the risk of social revolution by offering concessions to the 
more powerful members of the peasant class who were most likely to be able to enact 
social change in the system.  They purchased the obedience of these potential agitators by 
inviting them to join their organization, either as a soprastante or campieri, or by rigging 
property auctions so that the desired merchant or peasant was able to gain ownership of 
the land.  As a result, the mafia became seen as the principle means of upward social 
mobility that was available to most peasants, who were otherwise excluded from most 
forms of land-ownership (Blok 1969).  Success for a peasant meant that he would have to 
be recommended by his superiors, i.e., the gabelloti and campieri (Blok 1966).  Thus, 
although the patronage system under the mafia harmed many peasants, it also offered 
them a possibility of advancement to a higher level of society that wouldn’t have been 
available under a more traditional feudal arrangement.  To many peasants the mafia 
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represented a darker, more sinister version of the “American Dream” of being able to rise 
from humble origins to positions of power and influence. 
As discussed above, the patronage system in Sicilian society rewarded those who 
participated while punishing those who do not.  As a result, individuals had little 
incentive to revolt against the system even though the peasant class may have been better 
off as a whole in a democratic society with a more equitable system of landownership.  
The major obstacle in achieving the necessary social change in the system is that it could 
have only occurred by means of a revolution where the peasants used the power of their 
numbers to overcome the entrenched power of the ruling elite.  Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2006) call this the “collective action problem.”  At its heart is the notion that revolution 
is a public good with significant externalities; a peasant that chooses not to participate in 
a revolution will still benefit if the revolution is successful, although only the peasants 
who actually choose to revolt will bear most of the costs of a failed revolution.  
Moreover, a peasant who remains loyal to the ruling elite may even find that his situation 
has improved should the revolution fail.  As a result, any successful revolution must 
overcome the collective action problem by eliminating the perverse incentive of peasants 
to free-ride on the revolutionary activities of others.   
The collective action problem was especially influential in Sicily, not only 
because of the economic incentives for individual peasants to cooperate with the mafia, 
but also because of the clannish nature of Sicilian society.  Blok (1966) notes, “it was 
primarily the fact that the peasants were virtually unable to form themselves into any 
permanent organization which stood in the way of an institutionalized protest.”  The 
peasants were not aware of their unity, nor did they have any sense of their solidarity 
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(Blok 1966).  Part of the reason for this lack of cooperation is that the traditional methods 
of farming used in rural Sicily meant that there was no way for a peasant to increase the 
productivity of the land that he owned (Blok 1966).  Accordingly, because arable land in 
the village was finite, the only means for the peasant to improve his position in the 
village were at the expense of others in the village (Blok 1966).  Being friendly with your 
neighbor did not historically lead to an improvement of one’s economic status, being 
friendly with the ruling elite and competing against your neighbor for their support did.  
Therefore, there was little precedent for cooperation amongst peasants, and a strong 
inclination to support the status quo in the hopes that their loyalty to elites would benefit 
them economically through the concessions that the mafia offered to their supporters. 
Thus, by offering strong incentives for peasants to participate in the patronage 
system and by offering necessary social services (e.g., protection from crime, arbitrage, 
and employment opportunities) that had previously been provided by the feudal 
landowners and the Roman Catholic church prior to the land-reform efforts in Sicily 
during the 19th-century, the mafia became seen as a legitimate organization in the minds 
of the peasants.  This perception was enhanced by a strong sense of Sicilian patriotism 
and disdain for the absentee, ineffective Italian government.  This support was crucial to 
allowing for the sustainability of a social system characterized by high inequality.  As 
long as individual peasants perceived that their expected benefits of revolution (i.e., 
abolition of the patronage system) were outweighed by the expected costs (i.e., risk of 
reprisal following failed revolution, reduced income, risk of death, abolition of services 
offered by the mafia, and transfer of political power from Sicilians to mainland Italians), 
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the mafia was able to maintain a system where they were able to benefit greatly at the 
expense of the peasants.   
2.5 An Existing Economic Model of the Sicilian Mafia 
Bandiera (2003) created a model that showed that the conditions in 19th-century 
Sicily were optimal for the rise of the mafia.  Specifically, she concluded that it was 
possible to create a system where the decision of a landowner to purchase protection from 
the mafia was the economically optimum choice, even though it resulted in a worse 
equilibrium for the landowning class as a whole.  This conclusion is consistent with the 
arguments presented by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) that I discussed in the previous 
section.  In addition, Bandiera (2003) noted “all other things equal, mafia profits are 
higher where land is more fragmented.”  This theory agrees with the observed reality 
where attempts at land-ownership reforms in Sicily coincided with the rise of the mafia to 
a position of influence.   
Bandiera’s model is based around game theory and assumes that landowners are 
faced with two choices: to purchase protection from the mafia, or to go without.  Those 
who do not purchase protection are vulnerable to theft from bandits, while those who do, 
decrease their probability of being looted.  Furthermore, landowners are economically 
better off if they are the only one to receive the protective services of the mafia.  All else 
equal, bandits will always choose to loot an unprotected estate over one that is protected.  
Thus, as the number of unprotected estates increases, it becomes less likely that a bandit 
will choose to attack a land-owner who has hired the mafia.  However, if all landowners 
decide to acquire the services of the mafia, then the effectiveness of the protection will be 
relatively low, such that the fees the landowners pay to the mafia for protection outweigh 
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the reduction in banditry compared to a system where none of the landowners had hired 
the mafia.  In this sense, the model presented by Bandiera (2003) represents a classical 
basic prisoners dilemma where individuals do not take into account the negative 
externality in the system (i.e., the effect that choosing to hire protection has on the 
effectiveness of protection for other landowners), and, as a result, everyone winds up 
worse off than if they had cooperated and chosen not to buy protection at all. 
In the next chapter, I present an alternative model of mafia in Sicily to that 
developed by Bandiera.   
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Chapter 3 - Model Description and Methodology 
 
 This chapter discusses the model that I developed to describe the dynamics behind 
the landownership system in 19th-century Sicily.  As described in the previous chapter, 
Bandiera (2003) presented a model based on a game-theory optimization framework to 
analyze the system that led to the rise of the mafia in Sicily.  In contrast, I use system 
dynamics theory as the basis for my model.  System dynamics is based on pioneering 
work performed by Dr. Jay Forrester in the early 1960s (Forrester 1961).  Over the last 
fifty years the field has evolved into a “methodology for studying and managing complex 
feedback systems” (System Dynamics Society, 2008).  This methodology involves 
identifying a problem, developing a hypothesis that explains the cause of the problem, 
building a computer model to simulate the system involved, testing the model to ensure 
that it reflects real world behavior, and using numeric simulation experiments to evaluate 
policies that offer potential solutions to the problem (System Dynamics Society, 2008).  
A system dynamics model should incorporate stocks of populations, flows between 
stocks, and positive and negative feedback loops involving parameters in the system.   
The theoretical framework of the computer model used in this project is based 
heavily on one developed by Saeed and Pavlov (2008) to simulate the historical rise and 
fall of political dynasties in the history of China.  This latter model is built around three 
interconnected stocks: farmers who generate productivity, bandits who prey on farmers, 
and soldiers who protect the farmers from bandits and who are supported by taxes paid 
by the farmers.  Because they found that the behavior of their model is typified by a 
 24
series of oscillations in the relative populations of the three stocks, Saeed and Pavlov 
termed it the “Dynastic Cycle Framework.” 
My model uses a modified version of the Dynastic Cycle Framework that is built 
around three interconnected population classes:  peasants, bandits, and mafia.  Below, I 
begin by using the information gathered during my literature review (as summarized in 
the previous chapter) to describe the relationships and feedback loops upon which my 
model of the social structure in 19th-century Sicily is based.  After presenting this general 
framework, I then describe the numeric equations that the computer model uses to 
represent these relationships.  In a subsequent chapter, I will use this model to perform 
numeric simulation experiments in order to test hypotheses related to the behavior of the 
system and evaluate the effectiveness of various policies designed to reduce the power of 
the mafia. 
3.1 General Model Framework 
As with the Dynastic Cycle Framework described by Saeed and Pavlov (2008), a 
basic relationship between peasants and bandits lies at the heart of my simplified model 
of the societal structure in 19th-century Sicily.  This relationship assumes that peasants 
earn all of their income from sharecropping, a portion of which is lost to bandits (per 
Blok 1966).  Bandits, in turn, consist of a disorganized group of criminals who derive a 
portion of their income from the loot they appropriate from peasants, as well as a portion 
from illegal activities (e.g., prostitution, smuggling, gambling) that do not directly impact 
the economic well being of the peasants.  Because we assume that bandits and peasants 
are comprised of rational people who seek to maximize their total utility, we assume that 
peasants will choose to become bandits if they believe that their expected disposable 
 25
income from crime is greater than the disposable income they can expect to earn from 
farming.  This behavior is demonstrated by historical example, as periods of high 
unemployment led to six major increases in banditry in Sicily during the 19th-century  
(Bandiera 2003).  Similarly, bandits will take up farming if they believe that it is more 
profitable than banditry.  Because neither the bandits nor the peasants have perfect 
knowledge, this simplified cost-benefit analysis is based on their perceptions of 
disposable income as influenced by the historical income earned by members of the two 
population classes during previous years. 
In feudal Sicily, the number of bandits was kept in check by the standing armies 
owned by the feudal lords.  Following the abolition of feudalism and the creation of the 
Italian state, Sicily fell into a state of disarray, with almost no police presence and a 
prevailing system of anarchy.  Such a system can lead to societal collapse if banditry is 
considerably more profitable than farming.  In this situation, peasants will turn to a life of 
crime because they will believe that it offers an opportunity to earn more disposable 
income than they would as farmers.  This will increase the number of bandits in the 
system, as well as the total amount of crops looted from the peasants.  With a greater 
threat of crime from bandits, peasants can therefore expect their income to decrease.  
(These feedback loops are illustrated in Figure 3.1.)  Depending on the circumstances of 
the system, this decrease may be partly or wholly offset by an increase in per-capita 
disposable income caused by the decreased competition amongst peasants.3  In contrast, 
if the increase in disposable income from reduced competition is less than the decrease in 
disposable income from increased banditry, then the ratio of disposable income per 
                                                 
3 Given a fixed amount of farmland, fewer peasants working as farmers leads to a situation where each 
peasant will be allotted a greater area of land to farm.  This, in turn, results in an increase in farming output 
per peasant.   
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bandit to disposable income per peasant will increase and even more peasants will choose 
to become bandits.  This feedback may continue until the number of bandits has grown so 
large that they loot 100 percent of the crops produced by the peasants, at which point all 
of the remaining peasants will give up farming and choose to earn income from illegal 
activities such as smuggling or robbing passing merchants.  In this worst-case scenario, 
everyone in the system is worse off than they would be if banditry was regulated: bandits 
are no longer are able to earn disposable income from looting peasants as no peasant is 
willing to farm if he knows that he will be robbed of all of his potential income.   
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Figure 3.1: Simplified Feedback Structure of Model with No Mafia 
Peasants have two incentives that cause them to be willing to pay for services that 
give them protection from bandits.  On an individual level, peasants are willing to pay to 
reduce the likelihood that they will be looted of their income, as long as the reduction in 
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risk outweighs the value of the tax or fees that they must pay.   In addition, on a societal 
level, the peasant class as a whole can be better off by supporting a system that offers 
protection services, as the introduction of enforcement can prevent a systematic collapse 
of the social structure.  In many societies, this enforcement comes from police services 
offered by a government that is supported through taxes.  However, the lack of an 
effective police presence in 19th-century Sicily, combined with the distrust that many 
Sicilians held towards the Italian government based in Rome, led to an opportunity for 
the emergence of an alternative legal system in lieu of a legitimate one.  This void was 
filled by the mafia, which offered landowners and farmers protection from crime in 
exchange for high levels of tribute.   
 The mafia was an organization comprised of gabelloti who either were middle-
class villagers appointed by absentee landowners to manage their lands or former land-
managers who gained control of their own estates following the landownership reforms 
enacted in Sicily during the 19th-century.  These gabelloti exercised political control over 
the peasants by deciding which farmers would be allowed to work on each plot of land 
and the terms that they would have to pay to do so.  This relationship is shown in Figure 
3.2 below.  In order to gain the support of the mafia, a peasant would be expected to give 
them a large percentage of their income as tribute.  This quasi-feudal system was built 
around exploitation of the peasants, and as such, it was critical for the gabelloti to 
suppress any desires for social change amongst the peasant class.   
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Figure 3.2: Structure of Society in 19th-Century Sicily 
 
As discussed in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), undemocratic societies tend to 
be sustainable in two general cases:  when the status quo is maintained through the use of 
violent suppression of rebellion, or when the non-elite class perceives the status quo as 
legitimate and/or beneficial to their overall well-being by virtue of concessions granted to 
them by the elite.  The former option means that the gabelloti could maintain the societal 
structure by hiring a relatively large number of campieri to use the threat of violence to 
enforce the obedience of the peasants.  However, this option tends to be relatively costly, 
as it requires the gabelloti to pay their soldiers and also leaves them vulnerable to a 
potential coup.  In contrast, if the peasant class perceives the mafia as a legitimate social 
agency, then they will be much more willing to pay tribute and will have less desire to 
change the social structure.  In other words, as the importance of the services (e.g., 
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protection from bandits) that the mafia provides to the peasants increases, the costs to the 
peasants of changing the social structure to eliminate the mafia become greater 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).  As a result, the peasants will be more willing to accept 
the status quo without revolting or seeking social change.  This option may be more 
attractive for the gabelloti as it allows him to hire fewer campieri to control the peasants, 
thereby decreasing his total costs and increasing his net profit.   
 In general, each village in Sicily had its own mafia group, which did not associate 
with the groups from neighboring villages (Bandiera 2003).  Furthermore, the mafia 
fiercely protected its territory (Blok 1969).  As such, we assume that the village in our 
model is governed by a single gabelloto (roughly equivalent to today’s mafia dons).  This 
gabelloto, in turn, hires campieri (e.g., mafia soldiers) to patrol his land and protect it 
from bandits while enforcing the system of tribute amongst the peasants.  Although the 
campieri were sometimes recruited from the peasantry in Sicily (Blok 1969), the gabelloti 
most often chose to employ former bandits, especially ones who had a proven record of 
success and violence, as their reputation made them particularly suited to the 
requirements of the job (Bandiera 2003).   The campieri receive fixed salaries from the 
gabelloto and also keep a portion of any tribute paid by the peasants to the mafia.  
Although data regarding the relative income of campieri is not available, the fact that the 
most successful bandits were willing to join the mafia suggests that they viewed it as a 
more profitable career, or at least a more stable one.   
Unlike the flow between bandits and peasants, where individuals are essentially 
free to move between job classes based on their relative profitability, the flow of bandits 
to the mafia is tightly controlled by the gabelloti.  A gabelloto’s main desire is to 
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maximize his income (Bandiera 2003).  As such, his decisions to increase and decrease 
the number of campieri he employs are based on the impact that he believes such 
decisions will have on his profits.  Increasing the number of campieri has two effects on 
the power of the gabelloto:  first it makes him more powerful with respect to peasants, 
allowing him to use intimidation to pressure them for tribute.  Secondly, the size of the 
mafia relative to the number of bandits is important in determining the mafia’s 
effectiveness in controlling its territory.  Without campieri acting as guards, a gabelloto 
could expect a decrease in his overall profits due to theft.  However, instead of putting 
bandits out of business, the history of Sicily shows that the mafia often assisted bandits in 
crime such as cattle-rustling (Blok 1966).  In this way, the mafia also earns additional 
income from illegal activities, seen as a tribute paid to the gabelloto and campieri by 
bandits.  Increasing the number of campieri with respect to the number of bandits 
increases the ability of the mafia to control its territory, catch bandits, and enforce the 
payment of tribute.    
 Although hiring campieri allows a gabelloto to increase the income he receives 
from tribute, he also faces direct and indirect costs associated with the hire.  For example, 
the gabelloto must pay a fixed annual salary to every campiere in his employ, thereby 
decreasing his total profits.  More indirectly, any tribute paid by bandits causes the 
income per bandit to decrease, possibly to the point where bandits will abandon crime 
and begin farming instead.  The net result is a decrease in the amount of tribute the mafia 
receives from bandits (although this may be partly or wholly offset by an increase in the 
amount of tribute received from peasants). 
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 Because they are profit-maximizing individuals, peasants would prefer not to pay 
any tribute to the mafia.  However, the structure of the landownership system in Sicily 
forced peasants to pay for the privilege of being able to farm lands owned or managed by 
the gabelloto.  If the peasants saw this system as illegitimate, they had the ability and 
numbers to revolt against the gabelloto.  As such, it was in the gabelloto’s favor to earn 
legitimacy amongst the peasants by offering them services such as protection from the 
threat of banditry.  An increase in the relative abundance of bandits corresponds to an 
increase in the percent of the peasant’s income that is lost to bandits.  When the percent 
of income lost to bandits increases, more peasants are willing to pay for protection, and 
those that receive protection are willing to pay more in return.  In such a case, a gabelloto 
can increase his income from tribute while at the same time maintaining the perceived 
“legitimacy” of his role in society.  Increasing the amount of tribute paid by peasants 
increases the inequality in the system, leading to a greater risk of revolution and social 
change per the theories of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).  However, this increase in the 
desire amongst the peasants for the elimination of the mafia system will be partly or 
wholly offset by the increases in the value of the protection services that the mafia 
provides to the peasants and the corresponding increases in the costs to the peasants of 
any social change.  In contrast, a gabelloto can also increase the amount of tribute paid to 
him by using the threat of violence from campieri to intimidate the peasants.  However, 
doing so greatly reduces his perceived legitimacy and increases the desire for societal 
change amongst the peasantry.   
 In our model, we assume that the mafia wishes to maintain a minimum standard 
of legitimacy among the general population as a decrease in the perceived legitimacy of 
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the social system increases the risk of societal change (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).   
A change in the quasi-feudal land ownership structure in Sicily would have been 
catastrophic to the gabelloti’s ability to earn income and maintain his power (Blok 1969). 
If the desire for social change (i.e., the net benefits of eliminating the mafia system) 
became so great that the collective action problem against revolution was overcome and 
the peasants decided to eliminate the mafia either by using violence to seize the 
gabelloti’s lands or by seeking the help of the Italian government, then the mafia would 
have lost all of its political and economic power.   In addition, being perceived as a 
legitimate social construct by the average citizen was instrumental to the mafia’s later 
ability to gain political power, expand its influence, and maintain its power in the face of 
efforts by the Italian government to eliminate the role of the mafia (Blok 1969, Brögger 
1968).  One proxy of legitimacy in the system is a ratio of the peasants’ willingness to 
pay for protection to the tribute they are forced to pay to the mafia.  When the tribute paid 
exceeds the peasants’ willingness to pay, they will perceive the system as being unfair 
and the benefits of social change as being high, and the mafia will have to reduce its 
tribute demands in order to maintain the same level of legitimacy and decrease the risk of 
revolution.  Similarly, when the peasants’ willingness to pay increases due to an increase 
in the threat of crime, then the perceived benefits of the status quo increases and the 
mafia will be able to increase the amount of tribute it collects without having a negative 
impact on its perceived legitimacy.  Tribute is paid based on a fixed percent of the total 
output of the peasants.  Thus, if total output decreases, the income earned by the 
gabelloto also decreases.   
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Each year, we assume that a gabelloto must decide how many campieri he wishes 
to employ.  A minimum number of campieri are necessary to enforce tribute and 
obedience amongst the peasants.  This number is based on the total peasant population, as 
well as the desire for social change amongst the peasants (i.e., the perceived legitimacy of 
the system).  In addition, the gabelloto must also hire campieri to police his lands and 
protect peasants from bandits.  The number of campieri assigned to this task is based on 
the threat of crime.   It is important to note that the campieri do not act as a normal police 
force and actively eliminate the bandits.  Instead, they force the bandits to pay a portion 
of their income to the mafia as tribute.  As the relative power of the mafia increases, the 
fraction of each bandit’s income that he pays as tribute increases.  This increase causes 
relative bandit income to decrease and drives some bandits to become peasants, thus 
indirectly resulting in the same type of dynamics as if the campieri had acted as a more 
conventional police force (see Saeed and Pavlov 2008).   
The relationships between model parameters in the model with mafia are shown 
in the causal loop diagram in Figure 3.3 below. 
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Figure 3.3: Simplified Feedback Structure of Model with Mafia 
(Additions to model shown in darker font) 
3.2 Model Equations  
This section discusses the mathematical equations representing the relationships 
between the stocks of peasants, bandits, and Mafiosi, as outlined in the section above.  I 
begin by describing the methodology for calculating the average income of peasants and 
bandits.  I then describe the equations that the model uses to determine the flows between 
the population stocks.  Finally, I describe the calculations that determine the size of the 
mafia and the amount of tribute paid to the mafia.  Throughout this section, I use P to 
denote the stock of peasants, B to denote the stock of bandits, and M to denote the stock 
of Mafiosi.  These equations are based on the stock and flow diagram shown in Figure 
3.4 on the following page. 
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Figure 3.4: Stock and Flow Diagram for Mafia Model
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3.2.1 Peasant Income Calculations 
For purposes of this model, we assume that peasants rely on sharecropping for all 
of their income (per Blok 1966).  Bandiera (2003) assumed that total output of the system 
is fixed regardless of the number of peasants who are farming.  In this model, we instead 
use a version of the Cobb-Douglas production function: YP = AP ⋅ Kα ⋅ Pβ, where AP is the 
total factor productivity of peasants (i.e., a variable representing the effects of external 
factors such as technology or climate), K is the total capital (i.e., land) in the system, P is 
the population of peasants (i.e., labor supply), and α and β are the elasticities of land and 
labor respectively, such that β = 1 - α.  In the Sicilian economy, land was the 
predominant factor in driving total output.  Given the long history of settlement of the 
island, essentially all land in rural areas that could be farmed was being farmed 
extensively during the 19th-century (Bandiera 2003).  As such, any increases in 
population resulted in only a negligible increase in total output (i.e., labor elasticity was 
very low), while the effects of splitting the profits from farming amongst additional 
peasants resulted in an overall decrease in the average standard of living. 
This model also assumes that the total factor productivity is not affected by other 
variables in the model.  This reflects the situation in Sicily.  Because both the gabelloti 
who leased and managed the estates and the peasants who worked the land as 
sharecroppers were only appointed by the landowners for a temporary period of time, 
they had no incentive to reinvest their own earnings into increasing the total productivity 
of the land.  For example, even though simple improvements such as irrigation and 
fertilization would have increased total output by up to 20 times, tenants were unwilling 
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to invest in these improvements as they would not likely to be the same person who 
received the benefits from the investments (Bandiera 2003).    
Aggregate peasant disposable income in the model is equal to total output less 
total tribute paid to the mafia (TP) and bandit appropriations (L): IP = YP – TP – L.  Per-
capita disposable income is calculated by dividing peasant disposable income by the 
population of peasants: iP = IP / P.  Peasants decide to become bandits if they believe that 
their expected income from banditry (iB) would be greater than their expected income as 
peasants.  However, as in all economic systems, the peasants would not have perfect 
information regarding the exact income they would stand to earn.  To model this 
situation, I use a stock representing the perceived disposable income for a peasant ( Pi ) 
which is adjusted using a two-year averaging function: 
2
PpP ii
dt
id −=  
The net effect of the above equation is to introduce a delay into the system where 
peasants are basing their decisions in part on the previous years’ disposable income rather 
than the actual disposable income that they will earn. 
3.2.2 Bandit Income Calculations 
Bandits are former peasants who have resorted to a life of crime.  They earn part 
of their income by looting a portion of the produce generated by peasants.  This model 
assumes that each bandit is able to loot an equal amount (l) in a given time period.  The 
loot per bandit is in turn based upon the average output generated by a peasant: if average 
per-peasant output increases, then a bandit can expect to earn more by robbing a peasant.  
Similarly, when peasants are relatively poor, a bandit’s expected income from looting is 
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also lower than average.  This relationship is governed by the equation: l = l~  ⋅ e, where e 
is a ratio of actual per-peasant output ( Py = YP / P) to a typical per-peasant output level 
( Py~ ), and l
~ is the loot earned per bandit when per-peasant output equals Py~ .  This 
equation ensures that bandits will earn nothing from looting if total peasant output is 
zero.  Note also that this model assumes the amount looted is based on the total output of 
peasants prior to paying tribute to the mafia.  That is, it assumes that the bandits loot the 
peasants before they have made their annual payments to the local Mafiosi (e.g., while 
the crops are being harvested).  Finally, this method of calculating bandit appropriations 
assumes that the amount looted per bandit does not vary with the number of bandits.  For 
example, the addition of a bandit to the system does not result in any diminishing returns 
with regard to total bandit appropriations.   
The total amount of income that bandits earn from looting (i.e., bandit 
appropriations) is simply the loot per bandit times the number of bandits: BlL ⋅= .  
However, this equation only holds as long as Bl ⋅  is less than or equal to total peasant 
output.  Because it is not possible for bandits to loot more than the peasants are able to 
produce, the model will set L = YP if Bl ⋅  > YP. 
 Bandits can also earn income from a variety of additional activities, including 
prostitution, gambling, and robbing merchants who are traveling through the lands 
farmed by the peasants.   These activities do not directly affect the income of peasants, 
although they do result in an increase in total bandit income.  This model assumes that 
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each bandit generates a fixed amount Ba from these activities during a given time period.
4  
Thus, the total amount earned by bandits from these secondary activities is BaA BB ⋅= .   
Finally, we assume that bandits must pay tribute to the local Mafiosi in order to be 
allowed to operate with impunity.  This model assumes that the peasants pay tribute to 
the mafia in return for protection services.  However, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, the history of Sicily shows that the mafia often worked in concert with bandits to 
earn income from such sources as cattle rustling, prostitution, and gambling (Blok 1966, 
Blok 1969, Brögger 1968).  Thus, instead of modeling the mafia as an institution 
analogous to a police force which directly acts to decrease the prevalence of banditry, we 
model it as an organization that earns revenue from illegal activities by forcing any 
criminals to share a portion of their profits.  This “tax” in turn makes it less profitable for 
bandits to operate, and thereby reduces the number of peasants who will choose to 
become bandits.  In such a system, the peasants would be satisfied that the mafia is 
having a positive impact on the level of crime, even though that is not the direct intention 
of the mafia itself.  In this model we use BT  to denote the total amount of tribute paid to 
the mafia during a given time period.   
Total bandit income is governed by the equation BBB TALI −+= , and per-capita 
bandit income is BIi BB /= .  As with peasant income, we use a stock to denote perceived 
per-capita bandit income ( Bi ).  This perception changes based on historical earnings, 
using a time constant of two years: 
                                                 
4 Note that this method also assumes that there is no competitive effect between bandits with regard to 
sources of additional income.  That is, the addition of an extra bandit to the system has no impact on the 
amount of income each bandit earns from sources other than looting.   
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2
BBB ii
dt
id −=  
3.2.3 Flows Between Peasants and Bandits 
 Bandits are peasants who have chosen to live a life of crime rather than generate 
income as a shareholder.  For most untrained peasants in Sicily, banditry was the only 
option for earning income other than farming (Blok 1969).  This model assumes that 
peasants decide to become bandits if they perceive that the disposable income they stand 
to gain from banditry is greater than their perception of their future disposable income as 
a sharecropper.  Similarly, bandits will abandon their criminal activities if they believe 
that their expected disposable income from farming is greater than their expected 
disposable income from banditry.  This cost-benefit analysis is reflected in the model by 
the ratio of perceived disposable income per peasant to perceived disposable income per 
bandit: BPPB iii /= .  In addition, we assume that there are some normal flows between 
the population of peasants and farmers: some bandits will tire of the risks associated with 
their lifestyle and retire to a life of farming, while some peasants will seek the adventure 
and prestige associated with banditry even if it is not necessarily more profitable for them 
to switch occupations.  In a steady-state equilibrium these two flows will be equal.  The 
formulations used in the model to reflect this dynamic is: 
PrdT
dP −=  
)1(
)1(
σ
σ
−⋅⋅−
−⋅⋅= PBinP
PB
out
PP
iBa
i
Par  
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The first element of Pr  represents the flow of peasants who decide to become bandits, 
while the second element represents the flow of bandits who decide to leave their life of 
crime by becoming farmers.  An increase in the ratio of peasant to bandit income ( PBi ) 
implies that the relative profitability of sharecropping compared to banditry has 
increased.  Using the equation above, this leads to a decrease in the number of peasants 
who decide to become bandits, as well as an increase in the number of bandits who begin 
sharecropping.  The factor σ in the above equation represents an index of government 
control with regard to policing.  When σ  = 0, the system is characterized by a complete 
lack of state control, and bandits do not need to worry about being captured by the police.  
When σ  = 1, crime is completely unprofitable, as the model assumes that every bandit 
will be captured by the police.  This equation assumes that peasants and bandits will take 
into consideration their likelihood of being captured by government police when 
calculating their expected income from banditry.5  Finally, inPa  and 
out
Pa  are constants that 
balance the flows in the steady state.   
3.2.4 Determination of Mafia Size 
In this model, the mafia stock represents the number of campieri who have been 
hired by the gabelloto to maintain social order amongst the peasants and to police his 
property.  As discussed in the background chapter, the mafia in Sicily preferred to recruit 
                                                 
5 If a bandit knows that the probability that he will be captured by the government police is σ, then his 
perceived expected income is equal to a weighted average of his probability of being captured and earning 
zero income and his probability of not being captured and earning the normal amount of bandit income: 
)1(0ˆ σσ −⋅+⋅= BB ii  
Thus, the modified expression for the ratio of perceived peasant to bandit income is: 
)1/(
)1(
ˆ σσ −=−⋅= PBB
P
PB ii
ii  
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from the ranks of local bandits, as they relied on their reputation for ruthlessness and 
violence to intimidate peasants and bandits alike (Blok 1969, Bandiera 2003).  In the 
model, this relationship is represented by a flow between the population of bandits and 
Mafiosi.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, this flow is very different from the flow 
between peasants and bandits.  The latter assumes that there are no obstacles that prevent 
a peasant or bandit from switching professions, and therefore, they will generally choose 
the profession that they believe is more profitable.  In contrast, the flow between bandits 
and campieri is controlled entirely by the gabelloto who holds a monopoly over the 
protection racket in his village and therefore determines how many campieri will be 
employed each year.  Because historical evidence suggests that even the most successful 
bandits chose to join the mafia when given the option, the model assumes that the 
gabelloto will always be able to employ the number of campieri that he desires.   
 A gabelloto must hire campieri for two reasons.  First, campieri enforce the 
system of tribute amongst the peasants and use violence to suppress any desires for social 
change away from the status quo.  Second, the campieri patrol the lands managed by the 
gabelloto and act as a control on the level of banditry by demanding a significant portion 
of the bandits’ revenues.  Thus, the desired number of campieri employed by the 
gabelloto ( DM ) is dependent on both the number of peasants in the population and the 
relative threat of crime.  This model calculates the number of mafia necessary for peasant 
control as: PmM pcPC ⋅= , where pcm  is the mafia required per peasant as calculated by 
the equation: 
c
Dpcpc mm )/(~ τ=  
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The index Dτ  is used to represent the gabelloto’s desired level of legitimacy amongst the 
peasants, the derivation of which is discussed in a later section.  In general, a system 
where the mafia has a high level of legitimacy is one where the peasants see the mafia as 
a legitimate organization that provides important services, and therefore they have little 
desire for social change. Similarly, a system where the legitimacy index is low is one 
where the peasants believe that the mafia is an oppressive, illegitimate organization, and 
as a consequence, they are much more likely to organize and demand fundamental 
changes in the social order.  The number of campieri that are needed to control the 
peasants depends on the desire for social change among the peasant class, as reflected in 
the legitimacy index.  Furthermore, we assume that the number of mafia needed to 
control the peasants grows exponentially by a factor c.  Setting an exponential factor 
greater than one assumes that there is a “snowball effect” in the amount of violent 
resistance or active disobedience towards the mafia as the “collective action problem” 
against societal revolution is overcome (see the discussion in the previous chapter of 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)).  This is reflected in the notion discussed earlier that the 
gabelloto can enforce a system of tribute in excess of the amount that peasants are willing 
to pay, but only if he hires a relatively large number of campieri to use violence to 
suppress any desire for revolution or social change amongst the peasant class.  Finally, in 
the equation above, pcm~  is the number of campieri required to enforce a system of tribute 
amongst the peasants when 1=Dτ . 
The number of campieri that the gabelloto hires to police the bandits is dependent 
on the threat of crime from bandits.  As this threat of crime increases, peasants will 
demand that the gabelloto provide more protection from bandits (in exchange for higher 
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levels of tribute).  In addition, the gabelloto may wish to increase the number of campieri 
in his employ, both to protect his personal property and to maintain his status and 
position of power.  To model the relative threat of crime from bandits (γ), we use an 
equation that reflects the ratio of bandits to peasants and mafia, based on the approach 
used in the Dynastic Cycle Framework (Saeed and Pavlov 2008): 
MP
Bb += γγ  
For a given threat of crime, the number of campieri that the gabelloto will choose 
to hire is expressed by the equation: 
2~ γ⋅= bcBC mM  
where bcm~  is the number of campieri required for bandit control when the threat of crime 
from bandits equals one. That this desired mafia size is proportional to the square of the 
threat of crime index reflects the nature of the system.  The effect of banditry on the 
peasants (i.e., bandit appropriations) is directly proportional to the number of bandits in 
the system.  However, as described in the next section, there are diminishing rates of 
return when hiring additional campiere to police the bandits.  As such, the number of 
mafia that is required to control the bandits increases exponentially with the number of 
bandits.   In real world terms, this reflects the notion that a larger population of bandits 
will make the task of maintaining order more difficult as the armed bandits will be able to 
better coordinate activities and more effectively resist the campieri’s demands of tribute.   
 The total amount of campieri that the gabelloto wishes to employ is equal to the 
sum of the amount required for the control of peasants and bandits ( BCPCD MMM += ).  
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Thus, the change in the stock of campieri employed by the mafia during each cycle is 
equal to the difference between the desired and actual amounts: 
MM
dt
dM
D −=  
Similarly, we define a variable called relative mafia size ( m ) as the ratio of the actual 
number of campieri employed to the desired number of campieri: DMMm /= . 
3.2.5 Mafia Income Calculations 
The gabelloto earns his income from two sources: tribute paid by peasants who 
farm the lands he manages and tribute paid by bandits who operate within the territory he 
controls.  In addition, the gabelloto incurs costs related to employing of campieri.  Based 
on Blok (1969), we assume that each campiere receives a fixed annual salary ( ci ) from 
the gabelloto and also receives a certain percentage ( cλ ) of the total tribute paid by the 
peasants and bandits.  Thus, the total disposable income earned by the gabelloto is: 
])([)( MTTMiTTI BPccBPM ⋅+⋅−⋅−+= λ  
3.2.6 Tribute Paid by Peasants 
The amount of tribute paid by peasants is based on a percentage of the total output 
generated by the peasants.  For example, a Mafioso will give a peasant a plot of land in 
return for a fee representing a percentage of the crops produced.  If the peasant is robbed 
by bandits, he will still need to pay the same fee that he agreed on when given the plot of 
land.  As such, it is theoretically possible for a sharecropper to have negative income.  
This reflects the actual situation in 19th-century Sicily.  Blok (1966) noted that in times of 
drought or poor productivity, peasants often had entire years with negative income where 
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they ended up in debt to the gabelloti.  In this model, we denote the percentage of total 
peasant output that is given as tribute to the mafia as Pλ . 
The percentage of output paid as tribute by peasants is dependent on the effect 
that banditry has on their disposable income.  As discussed in the previous section, 
peasants are willing to pay tribute in return for perceived services rendered by the mafia, 
including protection from banditry.  We assume that the maximum amount that they will 
be willing to pay for protection services is equal to the amount looted.  The percentage of 
peasant output lost to looting is given by the equation: pYLq /= .  This model expresses 
the maximum willingness to pay for enforcement (WTP) amongst peasants as total 
peasant production multiplied by a percentage based on the percent looted.  When 
peasants lose 100 percent of their income to bandits, they will be willing to pay up to 100 
percent of their income as tribute.  Similarly, when there is no banditry, peasants will be 
willing to pay some base percentage ( 0WTP ) of their income as tribute.  This base 
percentage reflects the notion that the mafia provides services other than enforcement in 
return for tribute, including acting as an arbitrator in civil disputes (Brögger 1968) and 
providing more favorable plots of farmland to those peasants who are willing to pay for 
it.6  We then use a linear interpolation between these two points to calculate the peasants’ 
willingness to pay tribute in cases where the percent looted is greater than zero and less 
than 100 percent: 
))1(( 00 qWTPWTPYWTP P ⋅−+⋅=  
                                                 
6 In a system where the sole services provided by the mafia are related to protection, 0WTP  is equal to 
zero, and the willingness of peasants to pay tribute in a system with no banditry is also zero.   
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The main desire of the mafia was to maximize its own profits (see Bandiera 
2003).  As such, when banditry increases, they will recognize that peasants will be 
willing to pay more for protection, and the percentage of output that the mafia demands 
as tribute will increase correspondingly.7  In addition, the mafia has the option to demand 
a tribute percentage that is either greater than or less than the amount that the peasants are 
willing to pay.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, demanding a tribute in excess of 
WTP would cause discontentment among the peasants and an increased demand for 
change in the social structure.  In contrast, demanding a level of tribute that is less than 
WTP will make the peasants view the mafia in a more favorable light, as they will be 
receiving protection at a cost that is less than their maximum willingness to pay for such 
services.  We use an index of “legitimacy” to denote the relative social legitimacy of the 
mafia as perceived by the peasants, where legitimacy (τ ) is defined as the ratio of the 
peasants’ willingness to pay tribute compared to the actual level of tribute charged by the 
mafia ( PTWTP /=τ ).  When willingness to pay is greater than the tribute demanded, then 
we say that the system has high legitimacy.  When the amount of tribute demanded 
exceeds willingness to pay, we say that the system has low legitimacy.   
This model is based on the assumption that the amount of legitimacy is the system 
is set by the gabelloto when he determines the level of tribute he demands from the 
peasants, such that: cDP mWTPT
/1)/( ⋅= τ , where Dτ  is the mafia’s desired level of 
legitimacy, m is the relative mafia size, and c is the constant used to represent the 
exponential effect of the desired level of mafia legitimacy on the number of campieri 
                                                 
7 We can also consider the increase in tribute percentage as representing a system where the mafia demands 
a fixed percentage of a peasant’s income in return for protection, with not all peasants choosing to pay for 
protection.  As the threat of crime increases, the number of peasants who are willing to pay for protection 
would also increase.  This would in turn correspond to an increase in the total percentage of peasant 
productivity that is given as tribute to the mafia.      
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needed to control a given number of peasants (see discussion in the previous section) .  
By default, we assume that 1=Dτ , meaning that the mafia will charge a level of tribute 
that is equal to the maximum amount that peasants are willing to pay.  Charging less than 
this amount would mean that the gabelloto would be foregoing potential revenues that he 
could gain with relatively little protest from the peasants, although it would allow him to 
gain increased social support amongst the peasantry.  Charging more than this amount 
increases the level of inequality in the system and greatly increases the level of 
discontentment amongst the peasantry, thereby incurring a strong risk that the peasants 
will demand social change either by appealing to the Italian government for help or by 
actively revolting against the gabelloto and seizing lands for themselves. 
Relative mafia size is included in the equation for peasant tribute to model the 
effect of the size of the mafia on the mafia’s ability to collect tribute from the peasants.  
As discussed in the previous section, the gabelloto must employ a desired number of 
campieri in order to ensure that he can adequately control the peasants.  In addition, a 
certain number of campieri are also need to control the threat of crime from bandits.  
However, because of a delay in the system caused by imperfect knowledge on the part of 
the gabelloto, the number of campieri employed is based on the number that would be 
needed to maintain order given the threat of crime from bandits and peasant population 
size during the previous and not the current time period.  As such, the number of campieri 
employed may not be equal to the actual number of campieri needed to maintain order.  If 
the actual number of campieri employed is less than the desired mafia size, then the 
gabelloto will not have sufficient power to collect the total amount of tribute that 
corresponds to the desired level of mafia legitimacy.  Furthermore, as noted in the 
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previous section, the number of mafia needed to control the peasants ( PCM ) is inversely 
proportional to the level of mafia legitimacy in the system (τ ) taken to a power c.  Since 
the level of mafia legitimacy is equal to the ratio of willingness-to-pay to the actual 
tribute paid ( PT ), we can derive the following relationship: 
c
P
c
P
c
PC TWTPTM )()/(/1 ∝∝∝ τ  
If the total number of campieri employed (M) is equal to m times the necessary number of 
campieri ( BCPCD MMM += ), then we assume that the number of campieri assigned to 
control the peasants ( PCM ) is equal to PCMm ⋅  (i.e., we assume that campieri are 
assigned proportionally to peasant and bandit control based on need).   Thus, based on the 
above relationship, if the amount of tribute that corresponds to a desired level of 
legitimacy is DWTP τ/ , then cD mWTP /1)/( ⋅τ  is the amount of tribute paid when the size 
of the mafia is equal to m times the number of campieri needed to maintain the desired 
level of legitimacy. 
 
3.2.7 Tribute Paid by Bandits 
The second component of mafia income, tribute from bandits, is based on the 
assumption that bandits will be forced to pay a certain percentage of their profits to the 
mafia in return for being allowed to operate in the territory that the mafia controls.  If 
bandits are unwilling to pay this tribute, then the mafia will not allow them to operate.  
The model assumes that the amount that bandits pay in tribute is based on the relative 
power of the mafia (ψ) expressed as a ratio of mafia population to the population of 
bandits:  
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B
mMM
b PC
⋅−= ψψ  
where ψb is a constant representing the marginal mafia control associated with each new 
Mafioso.  As mafia control increases they will have a greater ability to police their 
territories, and will therefore be able to demand a greater share of the revenue from 
bandits’ criminal activities.8  However, when calculating the proportion of mafia to 
bandits it is important to include only those mafia who are available for bandit control 
and exclude those that are used to control the peasants.  As discussed in a previous 
section, we assume that campieri are assigned to bandit or peasant control based on 
proportional need.  Therefore, the number of campieri who are assigned to peasant 
control is equal to the number of bandits desired for peasant control times the relative 
size of the mafia (i.e., the ratio of actual mafia size to desired mafia size).   
 As the relative mafia control increases, the percentage of bandit income that they 
are able to demand as tribute increases.  This occurs because a greater number of 
campieri would be better able to patrol the gabelloto’s land and use the threat of force to 
fight any bandits who are unwilling to pay tribute.  However, there are diminishing 
returns with regard to the hiring of an additional campiere.  For example, while it may be 
relatively easy for a proportionally small number of campiere to demand tribute from the 
least intelligent or violent bandits, it will take proportionately more campiere to police 
those bandits who are particularly wily and can evade capture or who are more willing to 
use violence to resist the tribute demands of the campieri.  Furthermore, it is impossible 
                                                 
8 We can also think of mafia control (ψ) as being a factor that represents the percentage of bandits that are 
captured by mafia patrols.  In this system, the mafia will earn income by confiscating all of the illegal 
income generated by these captured bandits.  An increase in mafia control would be equivalent to an 
increase in policing effectiveness.  This, in turn, corresponds to an increase in the percentage of bandits 
captured (i.e., a higher ψ) and a higher percentage of total bandit income appropriated by the mafia.     
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for the campiere to demand tribute in excess of 100 percent of total bandit income.  For 
these reasons, we use a graphical function of relative mafia control to model the percent 
of bandit income given as tribute ( Bλ ).    This function is characterized by diminishing 
scales of return that ensure that the percent of income paid as tribute never exceeds 100 
percent (see Figure 3.5).   Finally, total tribute paid by bandits is calculated by 
multiplying total bandit income by the bandit tribute percent: BBB ALT λ⋅+= )(  
 
Figure 3.5: Graphical Function for Percent of Bandit Income Paid as Tribute 
We assume diminishing returns with regard to bandit control from adding additional campieri to the 
system.  Therefore, we represent this relationship in the model by expressing the percentage of income that 
bandits pay in tribute as a graphical function of relative mafia control over bandits.  This ensures that the 
tribute paid can never exceed 100 percent of total bandit revenues. 
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Chapter 4 - Numeric Simulation Experiments 
 In this chapter I discuss the dynamics associated with the model of mafia in 
Sicily.  I begin by setting the parameters of the model so that it is in equilibrium.  I then 
perform several numeric simulation experiments by changing certain parameters and 
looking at the net impact of those changes on the system.  These experiments are 
intended to either simulate actual historical events in the history of Sicily or to test 
policies that could have been enacted to limit the influence of the mafia.  They include: 
• Adding government control to the model to test whether the state of lawlessness 
in Sicily was important to the establishment of the mafia; 
• Setting the population of Mafiosi to zero to test whether the formation of mafia 
was inevitable given the conditions in Sicily during the 19th-century; 
• Increasing and decreasing the population of peasants to simulate the effects of 
population growth and emigration on the behavior of the system; 
• Simulating the effects of increased productivity from capital and technological 
investment on the relative influence of the mafia; and, 
• Examining the effects of changes in the desired level of mafia legitimacy on the 
system.   
4.1 Definition of Model Indices 
Throughout this chapter, we use four parameters to describe the state of the 
system.  The first two of these indices are used to model the economic and political 
health of the peasants.  “Lawlessness” is used to denote the relative power of mafia and 
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bandits compared to the peasants.9  This parameter is based on the assumption that 
peasants are better off in a system where they are not looted by bandits and do not have to 
pay tribute to the mafia.  It is defined as: PBMb /)( +⋅= φφ , where φb  is a 
normalization constant that ensures that 1=φ  in the steady state. “Economic integrity” is 
used to denote the percentage of peasant output that is kept by the peasants as income and 
not lost to bandits or the mafia.  It is defined as: pP YIb /⋅= ηη , where ηb  is a constant 
that ensures that the index equals one in the steady state.   
The second two indices are used to model the economic and political health of the 
mafia.  The index “mafia societal control” is an indicator of the relative power of the 
mafia, based on the relative size of the mafia population compared to the populations 
they control: )/( PBMb +⋅= χχ , where χb is a normalization constant that ensures that 
the index equals one in the steady state.  The final index, “mafia economic power” 
represents the relative size of mafia income compared to total peasant productivity.  It is 
calculated as PM YIb /⋅= νν , with νb  being a normalization constant that sets the value 
of mafia economic power to one when the model is in equilibrium.  A system with large 
values for the mafia control and mafia economic power indices represents a society 
where the mafia is a dominant political and economic force.   
                                                 
9 Note that there is a fundamental difference between the indices of “lawlessness” and “threat of crime from 
bandits” in this model.  The latter represents the relative impact of banditry on the population, and the 
peasants in particular.  In contrast, “lawlessness” represents the view of the Italian government who are 
concerned not only about banditry, but also about the mafia, as they view the latter as an organization 
outside of the law.   
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4.2 Equilibrium Conditions 
The first step of the experiments is to initialize the model so that it is in 
equilibrium.  These equilibrium values are summarized in Table 4.1 below.  I assume an 
initial population of peasants (100) that is much greater than the population of bandits 
(10), which is in turn greater than the population of Mafiosi (5).   
Table 4.1 – Equilibrium Values 
Parameter Definition Value 
P Peasants 100 
B Bandits 10 
M Mafia (Campieri) 5 
K Land 100 
α Land elasticity 0.7 
AP Total factor productivity 2.5 
Py~  Normal output per peasant 2.5 
aB Bandit productivity (non-looting) 0.5 
l~  Typical loot per bandit 2.5 
0WTP  Base peasant tribute percentage 4/9 
σ Government control 0 
Pi  Perceived disposable income per peasant 1 
Bi  
Perceived disposable income per bandit 1 
out
Pa  Normalization constant – peasant to bandit flow 0.01 
in
Pa  Normalization constant – bandit to peasant flow 0.1 
pcm~  Typical mafia required per peasant 1/50 
bcm~  Typical enforcement mafia 3 
Dτ  Desired mafia legitimacy 1 
ci  Fixed cost per campieri 10 
cλ  Campieri tribute percentage 0.02 
γb  Normalization constant – threat of crime from bandits -- 000 /)( BMP +  105/10 
ψb  Normalization constant – mafia control over bandits -- 00 / BM  10/3 
φb  Normalization constant – lawlessness -- )/( 000 BMP +  100/15 
ηb  Normalization constant – economic integrity -- 0/)
~( 0 PP iPy ⋅  250/100 
χb  Normalization constant – mafia societal control -- 000 /)( MBP +  110/5 
νb  Normalization constant – mafia economic power -- 0/)
~( 0 MP iPy ⋅  250/145 
 
 55
4.3 Experiment 1: Adding Government Control 
 As discussed in a previous chapter, the state of lawlessness in 19th-century Sicily 
is believed to be one of the major factors that enabled the mafia to become established.  A 
high crime rate and an absence of state enforcement agencies led to a willingness 
amongst the general populace to accept the mafia’s role as a substitute legal system.  In 
this model, the mafia helps reduce crime by imposing a “tax” on the bandits and reducing 
their expected income.  As a result, fewer peasants are willing to become bandits than 
they would in absence of the mafia.   
 I hypothesize that modifying the system to include the presence of state 
enforcement will lead to conditions that are less favorable for the mafia.  State 
enforcement agencies will act to control the level of banditry, decreasing the benefits to 
the peasants of the substitute legal system offered by the mafia.  This in turn will cause a 
decrease in the amount of tribute that the mafia can demand without losing legitimacy.  
With less demand for its services, the gabelloto will react by hiring fewer campieri, 
thereby reducing the relative size of the mafia.  Figure 4.1 below show the effects on 
class populations after adding low (σ = 0.1), medium (σ = 0.4), and high (σ = 0.7) level 
of government control to the model.  
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Figure 4.1: Relative Populations with Varying Degrees of Government Control (σ) 
Increasing the effectiveness of government actions to fight banditry causes both the populations of bandits 
and mafia to decrease, even if the government takes no direct action against the mafia itself. 
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As shown in these graphs, adding government control to the system results in a 
steady-state equilibrium with a higher population of peasants and lower populations of 
bandits and mafia than the equilibrium for a system without government control.  
Furthermore, an increase in government control results in a decrease in the equilibrium 
populations of both bandits and mafia.  This relationship can also be seen in the phase 
diagrams in Figure 4.2 below. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Effects of Government Control (σ) on a Mafia-based Society 
Increasing the effectiveness of government control of bandits is an effective tool for decreasing the 
lawlessness of society, increasing the amount of output retained by the peasants (i.e., economic integrity) 
and reducing the economic and social power of the mafia 
 
As shown above, increasing the effectiveness of government police forces is a 
very effective tool for decreasing the influence of the mafia in our model, even though 
the police focus all of their efforts on reducing banditry rather than taking direct action 
against the gabelloto.  This occurs because the high threat of banditry is what allows the 
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mafia to maintain its power.  When peasants do not need to rely on the mafia for 
protection services, the peasants’ willingness to pay for protection and the costs to the 
peasants of eliminating the mafia decrease.  As a result, the gabelloto must decrease the 
amount of tribute he demands, or risk increasing the demand for social change in the 
system.  This results in a net decrease in the mafia’s political and economic influence, 
although it is still preferable to a change in the social structure where the peasants gain 
control of the gabelloto’s land.  Furthermore, we note that an increase in the presence of 
government police could have a negative effect on the gabelloto’s ability to use the threat 
of violence to keep the peasants in line, especially if the government wishes to reduce the 
influence of the mafia.  The increased costs of using repression gives the gabelloto even 
more incentive to use concessions such as lowering tribute percentages as a means of 
preventing social change, although this latter relationship is not reflected in our model.   
The results of this experiment suggest that a government that wishes to eliminate 
the influence of a mafia-like organization should take steps to reduce the level of banditry 
in society.  Furthermore, these steps should have relatively quick impacts on the system: 
in the experiments above, the system reached its new equilibrium in less than 20 months. 
History shows that the influence of the mafia in Sicily did indeed decrease under strong 
governments.  For example, during the 1920s and 1930s, the advent of Fascism in Italy 
under Mussolini saw a marked decrease in the power of the existing mafia.  Blok (1969) 
notes that under Fascism “the rural mafia as a parallel-structure which functioned 
alongside and intermingled with the formal framework of economic and political power 
in the interests of the large landowners, became substituted by individuals who 
represented the Fascist party.”  Because the mafia did little to change the underlying land 
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ownership system, once the Fascists were overthrown during World War II, the mafia 
was quickly able to reassume its former role in society (Blok 1969).    
4.4 Experiment 2: Setting Mafia to Zero 
 As discussed above, Mussolini and the Fascists were able to greatly reduce the 
power of the mafia in Sicily during the 1920s and 1930s.  However, in the chaos 
following World War II, a new mafia rapidly came into existence to fill the power void 
that was created after the overthrow of the Fascist government.  The lack of a functioning 
public force and the failure of the Fascists to change the underlying land-ownership 
structure meant that societal conditions rapidly returned to those of the 19th-century, with 
both new and old figures taking the mafia’s role as a mediator between peasants and 
landowners (Blok 1969).  Because the landowners gave full control of the lands to the 
new gabelloti, the mafia was able to use its former practices of rewarding loyal peasants 
with prime farmland (i.e., concessions) and intimidating dissenters (i.e., repression) to 
reduce the demand for social change that had become more widespread as a result of 
Communist Party efforts immediately after the war.   
 In this experiment, we change the initial stock settings to M=0 and B=15.  This is 
intended to represent a situation where the government has been able to eliminate the role 
of the mafia in society, forcing all former campieri to return to a life of common banditry.  
If we run the model under these initial conditions without making any other changes, we 
find that it rapidly moves toward the original equilibrium of P=100, B=10, and M=5, with 
a very small dampened oscillation due to delays in the system (see Figure 4.3).   
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Figure 4.3: Model Run With Zero Initial Mafia Population (M = 0) 
Even if the mafia is eliminated temporarily, barring a change in the underlying structure of the land-
ownership system, it will quickly reform in the absence of effective government institutions. 
 
 One interesting aspect of this result is that it, in this case, it occurs even though 
the peasants would be better off in a situation with no mafia.  In the model that allows for 
the creation of a mafia, the equilibrium disposable income for both bandits and peasants 
is 1.0.  However, if we rerun the model under the initial conditions above (P=100, B=15, 
M=0), and eliminate the potential flow of bandits to the mafia, then we see that the bandit 
population will grow without the control of the mafia, but that it will eventually reach a 
stable equilibrium (see Figure 4.4a).  This resulting society is characterized by a state of 
lawlessness that is much greater than the level under mafia, but where the economic 
integrity index is also much greater (see Figure 4.4b).  That is, the peasants are able to 
keep a greater percentage of their income than they would in a society with the mafia.   
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Figure 4.4: Model Run without Presence of Mafia 
Although banditry is more prevalent in a system without mafia, the percent of output that peasants keep as 
disposable income is greater than in a system where the peasants pay tribute to the mafia in exchange for 
protection from crime.  This illustrates the notion that the mafia continues to exist even though it has the 
net effect of making the other members of society worse off (see Bandiera 2003).  
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The results of this experiment are surprising in that they show that, in this case, the 
peasants are supporting an organization that makes them worse off.  One of the keys to 
the mafia gaining legitimacy among the peasants is that it offers the service of protection 
from bandits.  However, the amount of tribute that the peasants pay to the mafia is greater 
than the total amount that they would lose to the bandits in a society with no mafia.  This 
would provide an incentive for the peasants to act to change the social structure to 
eliminate the tribute system.  There are several potential reasons to explain why this did 
not happen in Sicily: 
• First, the peasants do not have perfect knowledge and may not have realized that 
the benefits of the mafia’s protection services did not outweigh the costs.  This 
would have been particularly so if the mafia led the peasants to believe that their 
services were more effective than they actually were.   
• Second, as explained in an earlier chapter, the collective action problem was 
particularly prevalent in rural Sicily, with several factors preventing the peasants 
from organizing an effective rebellion.   
• Third, our model does not quantify the value of non-protection services provided 
by the mafia, including its role as an arbitrator of disputes and its function as a 
potential means of upward social mobility for the peasant class.  If the value of 
these services exceeds the difference in peasant disposable income in systems 
with and without mafia, then the peasants would have a disincentive to change the 
social structure.   
• Finally, our experiment may not completely reflect the state of society if the 
peasants were to act to eliminate the mafia.  The mafia would not have been 
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willing to give up all of its economic and political power without using any means 
necessary, including violence, to prevent an overthrow of the social structure.  
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) notes that violent revolutions often are associated 
with significant costs, including the loss of life, lost productivity, and the 
destruction of important infrastructure.  Thus, peasants will not demand social 
change if the expected costs of revolution exceed the potential benefits shown in 
this experiment.  For example, we can rerun our experiment by removing mafia 
from our model and decreasing total factor productivity (AP) by 25 percent to 
reflect a decrease in total productivity resulting from a revolution.  As shown in 
Figure 4.5 below, running this model results in a total collapse of the system, as 
the level of banditry grows so large that it ends up overwhelming the peasants.  
Because this scenario results in a system where everyone is worse off (per capita 
disposable income = 0.5, the productivity of bandits from non-looting sources 
such as smuggling), the peasants have a strong economic incentive to accept the 
status quo.   
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Figure 4.5: Changes in Populations with no Mafia and 25-Percent Reduction in 
Peasant Productivity (AP = 1.875) 
 
A revolution that eliminates the mafia without allowing for the formation of an alternative mechanism to 
police banditry can lead to the collapse of the system, particularly if the revolution causes a decrease in 
productivity.  The result is a system where the only viable source of income is from illegal activities such 
as smuggling and robbing travelers, as any peasant who tries to farm will lose all of his income to bandits. 
 
Bandiera (2003) also demonstrated that the mafia could exist in a system even if 
the people who support the mafia would be economically better off without it.  In her 
model, this occurs because there is an economic incentive to be the first peasant to 
purchase protection from the mafia, as bandits are much more likely to rob someone who 
is not protected.  However, as more people choose to purchase protection, the 
effectiveness of protection decreases to the point where all of the purchasers would have 
been better off if none of them had chosen to purchase it.  At the same time, if the 
majority of people have purchased protection from the mafia, then anyone who chooses 
not to purchase it will almost definitely be targeted by bandits and will find himself 
economically worse off than if he had chosen to purchase.  Thus, although the economic 
well being of the peasants will be better off if none of them choose to participate in the 
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mafia system (see Figure 4.4), it is an unstable equilibrium.  As soon as one peasant 
decides to improve his situation at the expense of others by paying tribute to the mafia in 
exchange for protection and other services, then society will rapidly move to the stable 
equilibrium we derive above, even though all of the peasants are economically worse off 
than before.  Thus, the results of our system dynamics model closely mirror the dynamics 
predicted by Bandiera’s game-theory optimization model.   
4.5 Experiment 3: Changing Peasant Population 
 The population of Sicily grew dramatically during the first half of the 19th-
century, increasing by 0.4 million between 1798 and 1861 (Bandiera 2003).  Because the 
productivity of the system was relatively fixed, this resulted in a society where more 
peasants were forced to compete for the same amount of land.  In economic terms, this 
means that the disposable income per peasant would decrease, and some peasants would 
have desired an alternative means to earn income or, at least held a stronger desire for 
social change.  However, those peasants who opted not to participate in the system of 
patronage were left with little opportunity to earn a living.  During the mid-19th century, 
they often had no alternative other than to turn to banditry (Blok 1969).  This was the 
situation in Sicily until the turn of the century, when emigration to the United States 
became an available option for peasant wishing to escape the sphere of influence of the 
mafia (Blok 1966, 1969).   
 In this experiment, we first increase the peasant population by 20 percent and 
observe the resulting dynamics.  This simulation is designed to represent the effects that 
increasing population had on the establishment of the mafia in Sicily during the 18th 
century.  Figure 4.6 shows that the initial increase in population initially causes the 
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relative lawlessness in society and the economic integrity of the system to decrease and 
increase, respectively.  At the same time, the relative political and economic power of the 
mafia decreases.  However, these changes are short-lived, as the increased competition 
between peasants and the corresponding decrease in peasant disposable income cause 
some of the peasants to choose to become bandits.  This change, in turn, increases the 
threat of banditry in the system such that the demand for mafia protection services also 
increases.  The net result is an equilibrium population of peasants that is less than the 
population after the initial infusion, as well as equilibrium populations of bandits and 
mafia that are both greater than the populations prior to the increase in the number of 
peasants.  Thus, the net effect of increasing population is an increase in relative 
lawlessness, a decrease in economic integrity, and an increase in the political and 
economic power of the mafia.  In this manner, the population increases in Sicily during 
the 19th century were an important factor in contributing to the rise of the mafia.   
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Figure 4.6: Effects of a One-Time Increase in Peasant Population (P = 120) 
A one-time increase in peasant population results in a new equilibrium where a portion of the new peasants 
have become bandits along with a corresponding increase in the mafia needed to provide protection against 
the increased bandit population.  Although the initial results of the population infusion are a decrease in 
lawlessness and mafia power and an increase in economic legitimacy, in the long-run the new equilibrium 
conditions result in a system with a net increase in lawlessness, a decrease in the percent of output retained 
by the peasants, and an overall increase in the political and economic power of the mafia as compared to 
before.   
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Next, we rerun this experiment, except this time we decrease the population of 
peasants by 20 percent in order to model the effects that emigration has on the system.  
The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 4.7.  The immediate effects of a 
decrease in peasant population are an increase in the relative lawlessness in society and a 
decrease in economic integrity, as the proportion of bandits to peasants increases.  As a 
result, the demand for mafia protection initially increases.  However, because there is less 
competition among peasants, the disposable income per peasant increases despite the 
increased threat of banditry.  As a result, some bandits choose to become farmers, 
especially as the increasing mafia presence makes banditry less profitable.  In the long-
term, as the bandit population decreases, the demand for mafia protection also decreases.  
The net result is a system with lower overall lawlessness, higher economic integrity, and 
a mafia with reduced economic and political power.   
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Figure 4.7: Effects of One-Time Decrease in Peasant Population (P = 80) 
A one-time decrease in peasant population due to emigration results in a new equilibrium where some 
former bandits have become farmers and the size of the mafia has decreased to reflect the decreased 
demand for protection services.  Although the initial results of emigration are an increase in lawlessness 
and mafia power and a decrease in economic legitimacy, in the long-run the new equilibrium conditions 
result in a system with a net decrease in lawlessness, increase in the percent of output retained by the 
peasants, and an overall decrease in the political and economic power of the mafia as compared to before.   
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 The results of this experiment suggest that a government that wishes to reduce the 
overall power of the mafia should enact policies to minimize the size of the population of 
lands controlled by the mafia.  For example, given the mafia’s power base in rural areas 
of Sicily, then the Italian government should have enacted policies that encouraged 
peasants to move to urban areas such as Palermo or to peninsular Italy.  In the short-term 
these policies would actually empower the mafia both politically and economically, and 
may therefore have been politically undesirable.  However, in the long-term, they should 
lead to conditions that are less favorable to the mafia.  Similarly, although any policies 
that encourage migration to lands controlled by the mafia would have positive effects in 
terms of reducing the mafia’s overall power in the short-term, they would backfire in the 
long-term and actually make the mafia more powerful than it was before.   
 This experiment also demonstrates that open immigration policies can be 
detrimental to non-democratic institutions such as the mafia system in Sicily.  Without 
emigration, the only options to peasants are to participate in the status quo, become 
bandits, or participate in a revolution.  A peasant who emigrates will incur costs 
associated with rebuilding his life in a new place, although these costs will likely be 
significantly less than the costs of revolution.  Thus, the introduction of open immigration 
policies increases the likelihood that peasants will choose to move from a non-democratic 
society characterized by high economic inequality to a more democratic one with higher 
equality.  As shown in this experiment, emigration can have negative long-term impacts 
on the power of the elites in a non-democratic society.  Accordingly, they may be more 
willing to offer concessions (such as lower levels of tribute) in order to discourage 
 71
emigration, as long as the costs of these concessions is less than the costs to their political 
and economic power that arise from a decrease in peasant population. 
4.6 Experiment 4: Increasing Total Factor Productivity 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, total productivity of peasants in Sicily remained 
relatively constant throughout the 19th century, as neither sharecroppers nor gabelloti had 
much incentive to reinvest their earnings into land improvements.  Because peasants 
typically used traditional methods to farm, improvements such as irrigation and 
fertilization or shifting crops from grains to something more profitable such as vineyards 
or oranges would have increased the value of the land by up to 20 times (Bandiera 2003).  
Still, any peasant who invested in these improvements could not be assured that he would 
be allowed to reap the benefits of his investment by farming the same plot of land in the 
following year.  Similarly, a gabelloto who leased his land from a landowner based in 
Palermo could not be assured that the landowner would not later lease the lands to 
someone else.   
 In this experiment, we increase the total factor productivity (AP) of the system by 
varying amounts to determine the impacts of improved farming techniques on the system.  
Increasing total factor productivity increases peasant disposable income.  However, it 
also has a positive impact on the amount that the bandits can loot.  As a result, although 
investing in improvements such as irrigation or new technology improves the standard of 
living of the peasants, it has relatively little effect on the structure of society.  For 
example, as shown in Figure 4.8, even a twenty-fold increase in total factor productivity 
results in only a small decrease in the number of bandits and the size of the mafia.  
Furthermore, the economic and political power of the mafia decreases by only eleven and 
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five percent, respectively, and the economic integrity of society increases by a mere four 
percent.  Considering the expenses associated with improving productivity, this does not 
seem to be a cost-effective option to reduce the relative power of the mafia.  If anything, 
government programs that increase the productivity of farming in areas controlled by the 
mafia only serve to enrich the mafia at the expense of other areas of the country.  For 
example, a twenty-fold increase in total factor productivity will result in a nineteen-fold 
increase in the total amount of tribute that the peasants and bandits pay to the mafia.   
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Figure 4.8: Impacts of Increasing Total Factor Productivity (AP) 
Investments in farming technology that cause a twenty-fold increase in total factor productivity (from 2.5 to 
50) result in a relatively small movement of the population from banditry to farming and a corresponding 
small decrease in the size of the mafia.  Similarly, as total factor productivity becomes progressively larger, 
the new equilibrium results in a system with small decreases in lawlessness, increases in economic integrity 
and decreases in the power of the mafia.  However, because the effects are quite small relative to the likely 
costs of technological investments, policies that are intended to increase total factor productivity are not 
likely to be a cost-effective means of combating mafia influence. 
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4.7 Experiment 5: Changing Desired Level of Mafia Legitimacy 
 As discussed in the last two chapters, a gabelloto who wishes to retain his position 
of power in society must take into account the perception of his legitimacy amongst the 
peasant population.  If the gabelloto forces peasants to pay tribute in excess of the amount 
that they are willing to pay for the services he provides, then he increases the risk that the 
collective action problem will be overcome and the peasants will take action to demand 
social change in the system.  For this reason, the model assumes that the gabelloto will 
adjust his tribute demands based on the peasants’ willingness to pay for protection, with 
the goal of maximizing his income while maintaining a relatively low risk of social 
change.  The legitimacy and loyalty that the mafia gained amongst the peasants this way 
later helped it gain political power through democratic elections and also hampered the 
Italian government’s efforts to combat its growing influence (Blok 1969, Brögger 1968).  
In contrast, the mafia could have increased its tribute demands by using violence to 
suppress the peasants’ demands for social change.  However, doing so would require that 
the gabelloto incur the costs of hiring additional campieri to police the peasants.   
 In this experiment, we vary the desired level of mafia legitimacy ( Dτ ) to test 
whether our hypothesis that reducing tribute demands in order to decrease the desire for 
social change is an economically optimal strategy for the gabelloto.  As shown in Figure 
4.9, increasing the desired level of mafia legitimacy causes the populations to shift to a 
new equilibrium.  Because peasants are paying less tribute to the mafia, farming becomes 
more profitable with respect to bandits, resulting in a net flow from bandits to peasants.  
The size of the mafia also decreases as the decrease in bandit populations causes the 
demand for mafia enforcement services decreases.  In addition, increases in mafia 
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legitimacy means that there is less desire for social change amongst the peasants.  As a 
result, fewer campieri are needed to control the peasants.  Decreasing the level of desired 
legitimacy has the opposite impact.  With higher tribute demands, relative peasant 
income decreases and more peasants choose to become bandits, leading to a greater 
demand for mafia enforcement services.  In addition, the size of the mafia grows because 
the increased tribute demands means that the gabelloto must hire more campieri to keep 
the increasingly unhappy peasants from revolting or refusing to pay tribute.     
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Figure 4.9: Changes in Populations Resulting from Changes in Desired Mafia 
Legitimacy ( Dτ ) 
 
A desired level of legitimacy greater than one indicates that the mafia is demanding less tribute than the 
peasants are willing to pay.  The result is a system with an equilibrium where farming is relatively more 
attractive than banditry and fewer campieri are needed to control both peasants and bandits.  A desired 
level of legitimacy less than one represents a system where the mafia’s tribute demands are relatively high 
and cause discontentment among the peasants.  As a result, more peasants choose to become bandits and 
more campieri are needed to police the bandits and to keep the peasants from demanding social change. 
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 As expected from the population dynamics and shown in Figure 4.10 below, 
decreasing the level of desired mafia legitimacy results in an increased level of 
lawlessness in society (due to both a shift from peasants to bandits and an increase in the 
size of the mafia needed to control peasants and bandits) and a decreased level of 
economic integrity (as peasants must pay a percentage of their output to the mafia as 
tribute).  Furthermore, by decreasing their desired level of legitimacy, the mafia can 
increase their relative political and economic power.   
 
Figure 4.10: Effects of Level of Desired Mafia Legitimacy ( Dτ ) on Society 
The mafia can increase its relative power by charging tribute percentages that result in a lower level of 
legitimacy.  Doing so also increases the amount of lawlessness in society (due to increases in banditry and 
mafia size) and to decreases in the percent of output that peasants keep for themselves. 
 
 At first, the results of this experiment suggest that the mafia should want to 
decrease its desired level of legitimacy, as doing so increases its relative political and 
economic power.  However, as discussed in previous chapters, there are several reasons 
why the mafia may want to maintain a greater level of legitimacy by not charging 
exorbitant tribute percentages.  For example, charging tribute percentages that correspond 
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to a low level of legitimacy would cause a large amount of discontentment among the 
peasants.  As a result, the potential benefits of social change for the peasants become 
much greater, increasing the probability that they will overcome the collective action 
problem and demand social change, either by refusing to pay tribute or by violently 
trying to seize the lands controlled by the mafia.  Maintaining a level of legitimacy 
among the peasants was also key to later efforts of the mafia to retain its power despite 
efforts by the Italian government to reduce its influence, as peasants were less likely to 
cooperate with the government instead of the mafia and the mafia was able to use its 
support amongst the peasants to gain political power through democratic elections.   
This experiment suggests another reason why the mafia would choose not to 
decrease its desired level of legitimacy: an increase in discontentment amongst the 
peasants forces the gabelloto to hire additional campieri to keep the peasants in line.  
Because hiring the peasants results in costs to the gabelloto and because there are 
diminishing returns in the additional amount of tribute that can be collected with each 
campieri hired, decreasing the level of desired mafia legitimacy can actually result in 
lower net disposable income for the gabelloto.  Figure 4.11 below shows that, for these 
reasons, the gabelloto’s income is maximized at the level of legitimacy that we have set 
equal to one under equilibrium conditions in our model.   
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Figure 4.11: Gabelloto Disposable Income with Various Levels of Desired Mafia 
Legitimacy ( Dτ ) 
 
Under the equilibrium conditions specified in our model, gabelloto income is maximized when desired 
mafia legitimacy equals one.  Although decreasing mafia legitimacy increases the amount of income that 
the gabelloto receives in tribute from the peasants, he incurs costs of hiring additional campieri to control 
the increasingly discontent peasants.  Under the conditions of our model, due to diminishing returns from 
hiring additional campieri, these costs outweigh the increase in revenues from increased tribute demands 
 
4.8 Summary of Experiment Results 
The results of the experiments conducted in this experiment are summarized in 
Table 4.2.  As hypothesized, the most important factor determining the relative power of 
the mafia is the extent of government control.  A mafia-like organization is much more 
likely to persist in a society with a weak government that is not able to provide stability 
or safety to its citizens.  As such, a government that wishes to reduce the power of the 
mafia should seek to change the factors that led to the formation of the mafia in the first 
place (e.g., high levels of banditry and an absence of effective government institutions).
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Table 4.2 – Summary of Experiment Results 
Effect on Equilibrium Values for:  
 
Experiment 
 
Peasants 
(P) 
Bandits 
(B) 
Mafia 
(M) 
Lawlessness 
(φ ) 
Economic 
Integrity 
(η ) 
Mafia 
Societal 
Control 
( χ ) 
Mafia 
Economic 
Power 
(ν ) 
 
 
Notes 
1 Increasing government 
control (σ) 
+ - - - + - -  
Temporary elimination 
of mafia  
(P=100, M=0, B=15) 
stable stable stable stable stable stable stable Mafia reforms and system returns to 
previous equilibrium 
Removing mafia from 
model 
- + n/a + + n/a n/a Disposable income per peasant is greater 
than in system with mafia 
 
 
 
 
2 
Removing mafia and 
reducing peasant 
productivity  
(AP  = 1.875) 
- + n/a + - n/a n/a System crashes as all peasants become 
bandits 
One-time increase in 
peasant population (P) 
+ + + + - + + Immediate decreases in φ, χ, and ν and 
increase in η following initial population 
infusion 
 
 
 
3 One-time decrease in 
peasant population (P) 
- - - - + - - Immediate increases in φ, χ, and ν and 
decrease in η following initial population 
decrease 
4 Increasing total factor 
productivity (AP) 
+ - - - + - - Impacts are minimal 
Increasing desired 
mafia legitimacy ( Dτ ) 
+ - - - + - - Gabelloto income less than when Dτ  = 1   
5 Decreasing desired 
mafia legitimacy ( Dτ ) 
- + + + - + + Gabelloto income less than when Dτ  = 1 
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Otherwise, as shown in experiment two, taking action to eliminate the mafia is not 
a viable solution, as a mafia will inevitably reform unless effective government 
institutions are able to assume the mafia’s role in society.  This also may partly explain 
why peasants never acted in concert to eliminate the mafia system despite the high level 
of tribute they had to pay.  Revolutions are costly, so a revolution to overthrow one mafia 
may not be productive if it merely results in the formation of a new mafia.  Furthermore, 
as shown in the second part of experiment two, even though peasants may be 
economically better off without a mafia, a violent revolution to overthrow the mafia may 
result in reduced productivity that makes them worse off than before.  In fact, under some 
conditions, absence of a mafia can even lead to systematic collapse if banditry becomes 
too prevalent.   
The size of the population can also affect the relative power of the mafia.  In 
general, an increase in peasant population has the effect of decreasing the relative power 
of the mafia in the short-term.  As such, a government may be tempted to institute 
policies that encourage immigration to areas controlled by the mafia.  However, as shown 
in Experiment 3, these policies will be counter-productive, as an increase in population 
will lead to a more powerful mafia in the long-term.  Instead, a government that wishes to 
reduce the power of a mafia should encourage emigration away from the area controlled 
by the mafia even though these policies would lead to a stronger mafia in the short-term.  
We also note that programs designed to improve the productivity of peasants by 
encouraging investment in new farming technology or land improvements have only a 
minimal effect when it comes to reducing mafia power, and as such, are not a cost-
effective tool for combating the influence of the mafia.     
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Finally, we showed in Experiment 5 that even though the mafia can increase its 
power by demanding higher levels of tribute, doing so may not be economically optimal 
for the gabelloto, as the costs associated with increased discontentment among the 
peasants may not be offset by the increased revenues.   
4.9 Suggestions for Future Improvements to the Model 
 
Our model suggests that a government can effectively reduce the power of the 
mafia in a region by maintaining a strong presence and lessening the need for peasants to 
turn to the mafia for necessary services such as private protection.  However, we note that 
there are several factors not currently included in our model that may prevent a 
government from being able to effectively reduce the power of the existing mafia by 
taking action against bandits.  Most notably, if the mafia sees the government police as a 
threat to their political and economic power, they may use any means necessary, 
including violence, to hamper the efforts of the government to police crime.  This 
resistance could help destabilize the entire economy, as violence tends to incur costs 
associated with the destruction of infrastructure and reduced productivity (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006).  Moreover, if the peasants had been relatively satisfied with the old 
status quo, then they may see the government troops as even less legitimate than the 
mafia, particularly if feelings of xenophobia lead them to distrust a non-locally based 
government (e.g., Sicilian distrust of the Italian government based in Rome).  In such a 
case, the peasants may side with the mafia in their struggles against the government, 
possibly leading to all out revolution against the legitimate government.  For this reason, 
it very important for a government to make early efforts to address the conditions of 
 84
lawlessness that enable a mafia-type organization to develop, as it may be much more 
difficult to eliminate the mafia once it has become an established part of society.   
We can model these factors in future versions of the model through the use of 
additional feedback loops.  For example, we could create a variable for “violence” in the 
system which reflects both violent resistance by the mafia against a government that 
seeks to reduce its power as well as violent resistance by peasants against the mafia when 
the level of mafia legitimacy sinks low enough that the collective action problem against 
revolution.  Any violence will likely have a negative impact on the total productivity of 
the system due to loss of life and destruction of property.  Although we model this 
relationship in Experiment 2 by permanently reducing total factor productivity, we could 
also add a feedback loop that adjusts for it automatically. As shown in Experiment 4, any 
reductions in total factor productivity will result in an increase in lawlessness and the 
relative power of the mafia and a decrease in the economic integrity of the system.  In 
addition, as shown in Experiment 5, a decrease in the level of mafia legitimacy already 
can result in decreased income for the gabelloto.  This result may be intensified if a 
decrease in legitimacy results in violent clashes between the peasants and the mafia, as 
decreases in peasant production will further decrease the amount of tribute that the mafia 
can collect.  
Finally, because the effectiveness of government control will be influenced by the 
willingness of citizens to cooperate with the government rather than the mafia, we can 
add a link that adjusts the effectiveness of government control based on the level of mafia 
legitimacy.  If the mafia is seen as illegitimate due to excessively high tribute levels, then 
the peasants will be more willing to help the government than if they perceive the mafia 
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as a legitimate, local institution.  In addition, as currently constructed, the model assumes 
that the peasants do not incur any costs associated with government control.  In reality, 
the peasants would likely have to pay taxes to help fund the government enforcement 
actions against the bandits.   These costs would reduce the overall benefits to the peasants 
of an elimination of the mafia in favor of a traditional police force, and makes them less 
likely to cooperate with the government.  Furthermore, because the elites in the system 
(i.e., the gabelloto and landowners) would likely share the highest burdens of the taxes 
associated with a strong government, they would strongly resist any efforts by the 
government to change the structure of society (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).  Their 
resistance to change would be particularly effective if the mafia was able to use its 
influence among the peasants to gain political power through democratic elections and 
influence government policy from within (Blok 1969).  All of these factors combine to 
make it more difficult for a government to eliminate an existing mafia organization than 
it is to prevent the formation of a mafia in the first place.   
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Chapter 5 – Examples of Other Mafia-Like Organizations 
In this report, we have examined a model built around the nominate mafia – the 
Sicilian mafia.  However, throughout history there are numerous examples of mafia-like 
organizations that built their power by exploiting a need for protection services during 
times of lawlessness.  Some of these organizations later became influential organized 
major global crime syndicates as happened with the Sicilian mafia.  Others remained 
relatively local and little known.  Table 5.5 below lists some examples of other mafia-like 
organizations.  Like the Sicilian mafia, each of these organizations came to power during 
times of extensive social change characterized by a lack of effective government controls 
and high levels of crime or other threats to personal property.  In addition, each offered 
important services to the typical citizens of the society, with most demanding tribute in 
exchange for these services, sometimes voluntarily, sometimes through the use of 
extortion.   Below, we briefly discuss each of these organizations, highlighting any 
significant differences or similarities between them and the Sicilian mafia, in an effort to 
demonstrate that lessons of our model apply not just to 19th-century Sicily but also to any 
conditions that lead to the formation of a mafia. 
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Table 5.1 – Historical Examples of Mafia-type Organizations 
 
Mafia-like 
Organization 
Approx. 
Date of 
Formation 
Social Change 
Leading to 
Formation of 
Organization 
Early Mafia 
Constituents 
Lack of 
Effective 
State 
Control? 
High 
Threat 
of 
Crime? 
Income 
Through 
Tribute / 
Extortion? 
Services Offered by 
Organization 
Main Sources 
Sicilian Mafia Mid 
19th-century 
End of feudalism Gabelloti and 
feudal guards 
Yes Yes Yes > Protection from bandits 
> Dispute mediation 
> Enforcement of status quo 
for landowners  
Bandiera (2003), 
Blok (1966, 
1969) 
Japanese 
Yakuza 
Late 
19th-century 
Industrialization 
and end of 
feudalism 
Unemployed 
samurais 
Yes No Yes > Property protection 
> Dispute mediation 
> Real estate foreclosure 
> Debt collection 
Milhaupt & 
West (2000) 
 
 
Hong Kong 
Triads 
1840s English acquisition 
of Hong Kong 
Criminals from 
mainland China 
Yes Yes Yes > Labor security 
> Protecting monopolies 
> Property protection 
Chu (2000) 
Russian Mob 1990s Collapse of the 
U.S.S.R. and end 
of communism 
Ex-KGB officers 
and unemployed 
soldiers 
Yes Yes Yes > Property protection 
> Enforcement of contracts 
Varese (1997) 
Bandiera (2003) 
 
Karbala Shiite 
gangs in 
Ottoman Iraq 
Early  
19th-century 
Expulsion of Sunni 
elites and end of 
Mamluk rule 
Local toughs, 
fugitives and 
military deserters 
Yes Yes Yes > Property protection 
> Protection of pilgrims 
> Collection of religious 
taxes 
> Regional autonomy from 
Sunni control  
Cole & Momen 
(1986) 
Ugandan 
drinking 
companies 
and vigilante 
groups 
Mid-1960s Ugandan 
independence and 
abolition of district 
autonomy 
Local tribesmen 
and former 
soldiers 
Yes Yes No > Maintaining discipline in 
social situations 
> Property protection 
> Prosecution of thieves and 
witches 
Heald (1986) 
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5.1 Japanese Yakuza 
The Japanese yakuza is one of the most well-studied and well-known mafias 
(Milhaupt & West 2000).  Like the mafia in Sicily, the Yakuza had its origins during a 
period of societal change away from a traditional feudal system.  In the late 19th-century, 
Japanese society made a rapid shift from a predominantly agricultural society to a 
modern industrial one.  However, unlike the situation in Sicily that led to the formation of 
the mafia, the yakuza did not form to primarily provide protection against rampant 
banditry.  Instead, its main role derives from the lax nature of Japan’s laws governing 
property rights.  For example, Japan does not have the types of bankruptcy laws or 
mechanisms that are prevalent in the United States.  As a result, companies and 
individuals are often left with few legal options to collect debts in the case of default.  
Similarly, Japanese law strongly emphasizes the rights of tenants over the rights of 
property owners, making it very difficult for a landlord to evict a delinquent tenant using 
formal methods.  In absence of a legal framework to deal with these situations, 
individuals and companies have little choice but to employ the services of a Yakuza firm 
to perform important tasks such as debt collection or real estate foreclosures.  Although 
in many cases, creditors and landlords are unable to use the threat of the law to force the 
cooperation of their debtors and tenants, they are able to use the threat of yakuza violence 
and intimidation as a viable alternative.  In this manner, the existence of the yakuza, like 
that of the Sicilian mafia, is directly dependent on the absence of effective government 
institutions.   
Milhaupt & West (2000) performed a regression analysis on data related to 
yakuza activities and enforcement and found that government actions that tried to use 
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anti-crime law-enforcement initiatives against organized-crime groups tended to fail to 
reduce the power of the yakuza.  Instead, their results suggest that institutional 
engineering policies that reduce the incentives for the formation of non-government 
rights-enforcement agents are the most effective tool for reducing yakuza power.  These 
conclusions are similar to the results of our experiments that demonstrated that the power 
of the Sicilian mafia is based on the need for a substitute legal system to provide 
protection services, and that the government can effectively reduce the power of the 
mafia by targeting the societal problems (e.g., high levels of banditry) that the mafia grew 
to address.   
5.2 Hong Kong Triads 
Another major modern organized-crime syndicate is the Triads of Hong Kong 
(Chu 2000).  After the British gained control of Hong Kong in 1842, they rapidly 
changed what was a small fishing village into a major commercial trading port.  The 
result was a mass immigration of workers from various areas of China, many of whom 
worked as dock laborers.  Less than three years after the founding of Hong Kong, the 
British passed an ordinance to deal with the emerging threats of Triads and organized 
criminal gangs.   
The Triads grew to exploit a need for protection amongst the different groups of 
Chinese laborers (Chu 2000).  In an effort to maximize their profits and reduce labor 
costs, the British enacted legislation that prevented the formation of trade unions among 
the dock laborers.   Thus, an incentive was created for the formation of groups that acted 
to protect the business interests of various labor groups.  In general, Triads emerged that 
were based around different groups of immigrants, many of whom came from different 
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parts of China and spoke different dialects.  The Triads used intimidation and violence 
against rival ethnic groups to prevent competition for various labor contracts.  This, in 
turn, gave incentive for these other groups of laborers to pay tribute to one of the many 
Triad organizations in order to protect their own interests, as they could not turn to the 
colonial government for help.  Thus, by banning traditional labor unions, enacting 
legislation that greatly restricted workers’ rights, and failing to provide adequate personal 
protection for Chinese laborers, the British inadvertently created the absence of adequate 
government institutions that was necessary for the growth of organized crime.   
5.3 Russian Mob 
The formation of the modern Russian mob is highly analogous to the situation the 
led to the formation of the Sicilian Mafia (Bandiera 2003).  Upon the dissolution of the 
U.S.S.R. in 1991, the Russian economy rapidly moved from state-sponsored communism 
to a capitalistic free-market society.  However, this change occurred before many 
necessary mechanisms and regulations governing the protection of property rights could 
be created (Varese 1997).  At the same time, a lack of adequate enforcement agencies and 
corruption in an underpaid police force, led to an immense increase in crime.  For 
example, the total number of reported crimes in Russia grew by 70.5 percent between 
1989 and 1992 (Varese 1997).  The result was an extremely high demand for private 
protection services, which led to the growth of various mob organizations providing such 
services.  This growth was so dramatic that, by the turn of the century, it was estimated 
that organized criminal groups controlled up to 40 percent of the Russian economy 
(Milhaupt & West 2000). 
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5.4 Karbala Shiite Gangs 
During the early 19th-century, a number of mafias formed in what is now modern-
day Iraq in territory that was then controlled by the Ottoman Empire based in 
Constantinople.  One notable example of these mafias arose in the city of Karbala, an 
important religious center populated primarily by members of the Shiite branch of Islam 
(Cole & Momen 1986).  Beginning in 1750, the weak Ottoman government allowed a 
corps of Mamluks (servant-slaves) based in Baghdad to govern Iraq.  However, these 
Mamluks were ineffective leaders.  Moreover, they were of the Sunni branch of Islam, 
which made them highly undesirable as leaders from the perspective of the Shiite citizens 
of Karbala.  During the early 19th-century, local Shiite religious leaders who were 
angered by their treatment under the Sunni government began to stir up a desire for 
Karbalan autonomy amongst their followers, and the Mamluks were expelled in the 
1820s with local Shiite elites assuming power in their place.  However, these elites had 
little experience governing, had no tradition of legitimate rule, and lacked a disciplined 
armed force.  As a result, they were unable to maintain order, and crime in the city soon 
reached untenable levels.   
The economy of Karbala was based primarily around its role as a destination for 
pilgrims who wished to visit the Shrine of the Imam Husaym, one of the holiest figures in 
Shiite Islam.  As a result, the elites had a high incentive to ensure the safety of pilgrims in 
order to protect their chief source of income.  Thus, when their control of Karbala 
deteriorated to the point where crime was rampant and pilgrims faced a severe risk of 
robbery or murder, they turned to an emerging mafia of local toughs and former soldiers 
to provide the necessary protection services.  These gangs also allied themselves with 
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local religious leaders, and provided a means to enforce their edicts, collect religious 
taxes, and agitate in their favor.  Moreover, because the gangs were Shiite, they derived 
legitimacy amongst locals by protecting the city from foreign Sunni powers, as 
demonstrated when they successfully helped fend off a Mamluk siege of the city in 1824.  
In this manner, we see many similarities with the Sicilian mafia that emerged to protect 
against high levels of crime, provided valuable services to those who agreed to pay 
tribute, and which was seen as a local organization that was preferable to a government 
based in a far-off city.   
The Karbalan gangs controlled the city until the 1840s.  At that time, the new 
Ottoman ruler in Iraq decided that he did not want to have an Iranian-dominated city 
controlled by criminals and rebels in his empire, so he launched a military offensive 
against Karbala.  When the Ottomans successfully retook Karbala in 1843, they 
responded by massacring 15-percent of the cities population, appointing a hard-line Sunni 
governor, and instituting highly restrictive policies that eliminated all Shiite autonomy.  
As a result, the power of the gangs was eliminated and many of the city’s Shiite 
inhabitants fled to Iran.  With martial law in the city and their power base dissolved, the 
Karbalan gangs were eliminated. 
Although the history of Karbala shows that it is possible to eliminate a mafia, the 
steps that the Ottomans took to do so are not a viable option for most governments.  For 
example, the Italian government is not likely to take military action in Sicily, massacre a 
great portion of the population, and institute martial law.  Doing so is highly costly and 
would rightly result in condemnation by the rest of the world.  However, it does 
demonstrate that eliminating a mafia is not enough on its own, as active steps must be 
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taken to reduce the likelihood of the mafia reforming.  In Karbala, this meant increasing 
the perceived legitimacy of the government by targeting those agents who were more 
likely to seek an alternative form of government.  However, even these efforts did not 
end the threat of organized crime completely, as the Iraq War and the resulting lack of 
government control in the region has seen the reemergence of criminal gangs in Karbala 
two centuries after they became a problem in Ottoman times (Farrell 2007, Mite 2007).   
5.5 Drinking Companies and Vigilante Groups in Bugisu, Uganda 
Uganda gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1962, an event that 
led to conditions that were optimal for the emergence of mafia groups (Heald 1986).  
Traditionally, rural Ugandan villages had been governed by tribal chiefs who used their 
power to maintain order and justice in their communities, with much business being 
conducted at regular “beer parties” which were instrumental in fostering a sense of 
community between neighbors.  In contrast, under the new constitution, power was 
removed from the chiefs and centered on a federal level with a uniform national 
judiciary.  This new government was often perceived as not representing the interests of 
local rural people, and because the tribal court was replaced by a magistrate who was 
often not from the community or even of the same ethnic group, villagers were usually 
less willing to use the judicial system to settle disputes. Without a strong local 
government authority or effective judicial system, rural Ugandan society soon became 
characterized by extreme lawlessness.  In Bugisu district in southeastern Uganda, crime 
increased by 322 percent between 1961 and 1968, with personal crimes such as assault 
and murder comprising the bulk of the increase (Heald 1986).  When disputes arose 
between neighbors, individuals often used violence to settle them, as they could not go to 
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the courts or the chief instead.  The result was a society where individuals tended to 
distrust and avoid interacting with anyone outside their household,   
The anarchy in the Bugisu District during post-independence Uganda led to the 
rise of two types of groups offering protection services, both of which were intended to 
supplement the existing administration rather than replace it.  Drinking companies 
provided safe environments for the “beer parties” that helped foster relationships between 
neighbors, and also acted as a rotating credit association in the community.  Meanwhile, 
illegal vigilante groups were comprised of villagers who maintained a sense of order by 
arresting and prosecuting people accused of crimes such as theft or witchcraft.  In some 
areas vigilante groups were closely associated with individual drinking groups and shared 
many of the same members.  Because these groups existed outside the law and came into 
being to act as a parallel legal system they share much in common with the Sicilian mafia 
and the other mafias examined in this chapter.  However, they differ from these groups in 
that they were not created with the explicit intention of earning profits at the expense of 
peasants.  Rather, they were formed by the peasants themselves to address the lack of 
adequate government institutions.  Still, in later years, vigilante groups strayed from their 
original intention when they became allied with political parties and began using their 
power to intimidate and terrorize rival candidates.  In this manner, the leaders of these 
groups were able to earning income through patronage as large sums of money became 
available through party sponsorship of development projects.  
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Chapter 6 - Discussion and Conclusions 
 
As can be shown from the case studies in Chapter 5, most mafias have much in 
common with the Sicilian mafia.  All are formed in societies that lack key government 
institutions governing the enforcement of property rights and/or ensuring personal safety.  
Many of these situations arose during a rapid change in society, including major shifts in 
political or economic structures.  Moreover, most mafias recognize a demand for services 
not provided by governments and are able to establish a quasi-legitimate role in society 
by fulfilling this demand.  Sometimes, these services are necessary because the 
government is weak or ineffective (e.g., Russia), or because of political upheaval (e.g., 
Sicily).  Other times, ethnic or cultural differences may lead to a government that 
neglects certain areas or people (e.g., Uganda, Hong Kong).  Finally, mafias often arise to 
protect property-rights in markets that are outside the law.  For example, many organized 
crime syndicates in the United States offer market protection services to traders of illegal 
drugs, prostitution, and gambling, as people who earn their living in these areas cannot 
rely on the government or legal system to protect their property or enforce their business 
contracts (Anderson & Bandiera 2006).   
Given the similarity between mafias, the lessons of our model will apply to most 
cases where mafias exist, as long as the mafias earn their income by charging tribute from 
the people or organizations that they protect.  In general, the most effective method for 
combating mafias is to try to remedy the institutional flaws that led people to seek an 
alternate enforcement mechanism in the first place.  This usually means creating and 
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maintaining strong government structures that provide adequate protection of property 
rights and personal safety.    
We can also use the lessons of our model to predict when mafias will form.  Two 
examples of such societies are modern-day Iraq and Afghanistan.  Both countries have 
seen political upheaval following wars that ended the rule of their powerful leaders (e.g., 
Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, respectively).  Because an effective leader or 
government was not able to immediately assume control of society, each country fell into 
a state of anarchy characterized by high crime, violence, and a lack of order: conditions 
that have often led to the growth of mafias in the past.  Indeed, recent years have seen the 
emergence of criminal gangs in Iraq (Farrell 2007, Mite 2007) and mafia-syndicates in 
Afghanistan (Laughlin 2009, Irvine 2007), many of which have ended up funding 
terrorists or fighting against the United States and its allies.  However, the rise of these 
mafias was not necessarily inevitable.  For example, after deposing Saddam Hussein, the 
United States and its allies chose to disband the army and government of Iraq, which 
directly contributed to the state of lawlessness in the country, as no alternative 
government existed that could quickly assume power and maintain order (Kaplan 2007).  
Had the United States and its allies chosen a different policy or if they had stationed a 
substantially greater number of ground troops in the country, then they may have been 
able to prevent lawlessness, maintain order, and avoid the types of conditions favorable 
to the growth of mafias.  Furthermore, now that Iraq relies to a great extent on U.S. and 
British soldiers to maintain order in many parts of the country, we could expect that the 
Iraqi mafias will gain significant power after the U.S. withdraws its troops, unless the 
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new Iraqi government exhibits the stability, legitimacy, and effective police force that are 
necessary to protect its citizens and discourage lawlessness.   
Based on our model and case studies, we could predict similar situations to occur 
if the United States were to act to overthrow other world leaders in troublesome areas of 
the world, such as Kim Jong-il in North Korea, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, or the 
Sudanese government in Khartoum.  Without providing an alternative government that 
has the legitimacy and strength to assume power upon the overthrow of the old, or 
committing U.S. soldiers to stay in the country to act as agents of order, we should expect 
the rapid formation of mafias offering alternative sources of protection.  Because these 
mafias would then wield enormous amounts of political and economic power, we could 
also predict that when a government does form, it will likely be comprised of the leaders 
of the strongest mafias.  Given these realities, models and studies that examine the 
dynamics of mafias and mafia formations will have important future ramifications not 
only on the field of law enforcement, but on foreign policy as well. 
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